Hahaha! http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nba-ball-dont-lie/kobe-bryant-fires-few-hilarious-salvos-jeremy-lin-174131018.html
Reporter: Would you consider guarding [Lin] if he’s having [a good game]?
Kobe: Jesus Christ! Let’s not get ahead of ourselves.
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Just to play devil's advocate (did you expect anything less?), when you play the Nets, Wiz, and then have Old Man Fisher guard you - any mediocre player can look like Wilt Freaking Chamberlain. :)
He is pretty fearless, or maybe he's riding high and the logic center of his brain hasn't yet realized, "Hey, I'm in MSG outplaying Kobe!" I didn't think he could step up and hit the clutch shots, but he proved it tonight. Once again, an ex-Warrior shines AFTER he leaves the Bay! The ESPN announcers were saying they should try to get Lin in the rookie-soph All-Star game.
The W's currently have a PG Charles Jenkins, 2nd round pick out of Hofstra, averaging 2-1-1. WTF they kept that dude over Lin? I really don't think Lin is a legit difference maker (there is obviously a reason he was cut by 2 mediocre teams), but heck, keep him on the roster to sell jerseys and tickets at least (especially in the Chinese-heavy Bay Area). Well, we got clowns for mgmt for all the Oakland franchises.
How are you guys doing?
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Whats wrong with a religious comment or two? Kobe Bryant talks about
Jesus Christ in his interviews.
From what I've seen, it seems like Lin has a lot of tools to work
with. The scouting report obviously was that he couldnt shoot so the
Lakers gave him more room on jump shots. We'll see how he does when
defenses adjust to slow him down.
Its just interesting to me how scouts and teams can overlook talent
and how players can develop in ways that defy expectations. Rondo was
a #21 pick. Kevin Johnson was stuck behind Mark Price in Cleveland.
The Blazers took Sam Bowie over MJ. But Lin's story is amazing in
that even colleges didn't seriously recruit him.
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obe was just giving ups to Jesus, and actually comparing Lin to him - so it was a compliment!
Yeah I think Lin is another example of the "Moneyball" effect. Sports are so irrational - the "talent scouts" have their subjective biased notions of what a top prospect should look like, and if you don't fit the mold, then they pass on you no matter your intangibles or hidden assets. I guess the principle applies to some non-athletic workplaces too. Top hoops players don't look like Lin, and they are more athletic, so why should UNC or Kansas bother to recruit him (not that Lin was at that level at age 18, but just making the argument)?
You need real metrics to gauge talent (sorry I'm starting to sound like Mark Cuban). If you keep picking the same type of guys, you'll never get an advantage cuz the other teams are doing the same. Then you're just hoping for luck, cheating, or "great coaching" to get an edge. Some impact players don't look that great from a stats perspective: Shane Battier, Nnamdi Asumugua (I know I'm spelling that wrong!). But most people just look at scoring and size, so they want Durant types.
I guess most hoopsters under 21 have at least a couple deficiencies in their games. I am sure NBA teams were concerned with Rondo's size and shooting. But they don't take the next step and look at the kid's potential, or how they can adjust the team's system to minimize the player's weaknesses and enhance his strengths. Look how Denver and Florida's systems made Tebow more successful. It's easy to just look at individual stats or physical features, but these are complex team sports. You have to measure the player's overall contribution to making the team win (like Billy Beane did). And if Lin or Rondo's ratings are higher than say hyped prospects like Wall or Walker, then you pick Lin first. It may not work out every time, but with enough tries you will win in the long term.
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So are we saying that the whole scouting profession needs to be re-evaluated because Jeremy Lin has had five good games, one of which included 8-24 shooting? Moneyball was based on using certain statistics to build a team on a limited budget. If the A's had more financial resources, there's no way they would pick the same players. It's easy to sit here and talk about the successful guys that don't "fit the mold", but if you were building a team I'm pretty sure you'd take your chances with five John Walls instead of five Jeremy Lins. John Wall is going to work out more often. Unless you're claiming that you would pick Jeremy Lin with the first pick in the draft. College football fans do the same thing. They have a couple of scrappy, low-rated players that play well, and then they say they need to build their team with those guys. Then they'll turn around and complain about the low star ratings of their recruiting class or the overall lack of talent on the team.
By the way Lin was cut by the Warriors to free up money to get DeAndre Jordan, and they actually tried to get him back.
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To be totally honest, I don't really like watching Lin play and I wouldn't want him if I was a GM. I am rooting for him and I like his story of course. I just used Lin as an example to show that deviating from the status quo can be beneficial at times. If the objective data say that Wall is better than Lin in terms of bang for buck, then I go with Wall. I'm just saying that conventional scouting can miss some of the intangibles, or favor some less relevant metrics over more important ones.
Look at the Yankees, BoSox, or Real Madrid soccer - money definitely helps get a decent number of wins, but you usually can't buy a championship. You have to innovate or perish. The rich teams can get away with "stupid" scouting because talent/production is generally correlated with salary, and they can absorb some bad contracts. But the cool thing about taking a chance on a dark horse is it's not that costly. If the Lin experiment doesn't work out, no biggie. But he has upside. Going all-in on a Greg Oden or Eddy Curry is a bigger sacrifice if you're wrong, and could set you back for years. UNLV hoops and Miami football rose to prominence because they took a chance and started recruiting urban kids who were overlooked by the big programs. Unless you're rolling in cash, you have to look for hidden talent and untapped supply. The greenest pastures are already crowded.
As you said, it's easy to Monday evening quarterback this type of stuff. All the signs pointed to Sam Bowie having a great career and Kurt Warner never amounting to anything. They're outliers. In general, making the "safe pick" works out. But the competition in pro sports is getting so tight and unforgiving, that any sort of edge that your rivals aren't exploiting is probably worth looking into.
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Obviously every team has to individually evaluate each player. Outside of team-specific systems or preferences, most teams converge on a similar hierarchy of player ratings. Even if a team really likes Jeremy Lin, it makes no sense to draft him high because you can just get him later. You don't choose Jeremy Lin over John Wall, because John Wall's ceiling is much higher. You just pick up Jeremy Lin late in the draft or as an undrafted free agent, which has basically no downside. Then you get both. You don't attempt to fund your whole retirement with money market funds or bonds. If you pick the player that everyone think is a can't miss prospect, and he doesn't pan out, they will say you were unlucky. If you pick the guy nobody else likes, the supposed diamond in the rough, then they will say you were dumb. Using guys who struggled with injuries as examples is not really fair, as no one has a crystal ball to foresee that. Very rarely do teams win championships with rosters full of average or above average players. The 2004 Pistons come to mind, but that was aided by the dysfunction of the Lakers. When you have the opportunity to try to get superstar players you have to take it, especially in the NBA draft, where the rookie salaries are predetermined and not exorbitant. Miami had basically no football history prior to 1980. Sure they took chances on some local talent that they may have overlooked before, but they weren't rejecting highly decorated recruits in order to do it. They didn't really have much of a choice.
The question is not whether you should ever take a chance on an "off the radar" guy but whether, when all players are available, you're going to choose the "off the radar" guy over the "can't miss" guy. You're a Raiders fan. How do you feel about the drafting of Mike Mitchell in the first round (about 3 rounds earlier than his projection) versus the drafting of Mike Huff in the first round? They've both been unspectacular, but one pick looks way worse than the other.
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I never said that you should draft longshots over safer bets. But at least look at the longshots when appropriate - and not every team does. Lin may be a relative "steal" at his $300K one-year contract or whatnot (esp. if NY is paying luxury tax, but I'm not sure their situation), but probably most teams would prefer to save up and pay a superstar like Durant $16M/year. You can only have 5 guys on the floor at a time, and 12 total, so of course you want to pack in as many stars as you can afford, instead of 12 under-rated value players. But for MIA that spent a lot for 3 stars and 2 more veterans, they could really benefit from penny pinching at the back end to find enough value to get them to the promised land. Of course you have to pay the right stars the right amount of money. The NBA probably overpays for size, and the NFL sometime overpays for speed and QBs. Bottom line, get the most bang for your buck - wins, jersey sales, TV contracts, whatever you measure success by. Don't just pick a player because he looks good or fits some arbitrary profile.
With the Yankees' financial advantages, I actually consider them bigger losers than the Rockies, who at half the payroll give it a good playoff run each year. Of course they have a weaker division and all that, but you get my point. The Yankees are supposed to win each year, so if they don't, they have fewer excuses than the A's. The equation is different if you are the deep pocket Goliath, or the reigning champ. But 90% of the teams in the league are not in that situation. That's why they have to be different to get an edge. If a poor team does exactly what a rich team does, they will lose 99% of the time, and at best they will achieve parity (with amazing luck). "Fight fair but avoid a fair fight." Don't play on Goliath's terms. Most franchises have more in common with U-of-Miami than the Yankees. I guess the draft helps weaker teams get a fighting chance next season, but clearly it's not a guarantee. So that puts even more pressure on struggling teams to get drafts and trades right.
The Raiders are kind of a bizarre example because their recent drafting history has been so atrocious. For the prospects that Davis "over-paid" for (i.e. drafted too highly) like Huff and Bey, there was an equal number of "sure thing" college stars who underperformed (Russell, Gallery, and probably McFadden too considering his health). So no formula is 100% safe. Maybe Seabass and Lechler were their best picks, but we'd probably need a more sophisticated analysis to measure their incremental benefits to the team vs. alternatives.
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Well I guess I'm not sure what we're arguing about then. It could be argued that three teams have looked at Jeremy Lin "when appropriate", because three teams have had him in on their rosters. All of them got him without having to draft him instead of another player, and they are paying him about as little as he can be paid. That seems like bang for your buck. And again, it's not like no one has given him a chance. He's been on three teams and up until 10 days ago hadn't played well enough to warrant being given more playing time. Obviously teams want to get superstars. No team goes into free agency with "under the radar" guys as its first choice, unless that's all they can afford. As for using arbitrary profiles, I think if you look through the entire draft you will see people of all shapes, sizes, and skill sets. I'd say the one thing that is common is that they usually have one standout, or at least above average trait. They are either big, strong, quick, long, great ballhandlers, great shooters or something. Jeremy Lin doesn't have any of those traits and generally played against a low level of competition. He's arguably average at best in all those areas, so it's hard to justify picking him any earlier than late in the draft or as a free agent. I would be curious to know what qualities you would look at in a guy who is doesn't have good athleticism, is not a good shooter, and plays against weak competition that would make you comfortable in projecting them to be successful in the NBA. Come to think of it, I think both your teams (Kings and Warriors) have drafted players high in the draft (Stephen Curry and Jimmer Fredette) that were both pretty highly rated prospects despite not having prototypical traits. So in that regard I would say the scouting is not as rigid as you make it out to be.
As for your paragraph about baseball, that's consistent with what I said. The teams that are penny pinching are doing it because they have to. They don't have a choice. The teams that have more resources aren't penny pinching because they don't have to. It seemed like you were saying before that teams should be targeting "under the radar" guys over highly rated guys even when they have the opportunity and means to get either one. I thought this because the frequent examples of John Wall and other NBA draft choices. But you're saying that you didn't mean that. So, just like in your example of the University of Miami football program, the choice of under the radar guys is made out of necessity. The only reason I brought up the Raiders (Huff and Mike Mitchell) was to make a point about drafting under the radar guys high versus picking guys where they are projected to go. Mike Huff may not have turned out to be great, but he was a consensus first round pick and someone would have picked him in the next handful of picks. I don't think anyone faulted the Raiders for picking him at the time. At most they could have traded down a few picks and gotten him, but they couldn't have waited another round to get him. Mike Mitchell was projected in the 3rd or 4th round, and they took him in the first round. That means they could have waited and gotten him for much less money. This was meant as an example of why it would be acceptable to pick John Wall first overall and dumb to pick Jeremy Lin overall, even if you like him a lot. But you said that you didn't mean that, so it doesn't really matter anyway.
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Scouting is not as rigid as a 2x4, but it could be more open-minded and data-driven, that's all. I wouldn't say that players like Jimmer and Curry don't have prototypical traits. They were dead-eye shooters who could also drive, and had some success in clutch situations leading their teams against bigger programs in the NCAA tourney. They aren't physical, but not every scorer has to be (Reggie, Mullin). They were also "high character" guys and likely fan favorites. I am not sure if those traits are worth drafting high for vs. pure athleticism, but they have them at least. I also think that the NBA draft is the lowest-risk draft compared to MLB and NFL (I think the data bear that out too). NBA rookies can contribute immediately, top picks are less likely to bust, and they have relatively fewer problems adapting to the pros. HS players are more risky of course.
Your comment about the level of competition a prospect faced is a good one. That's probably why many soccer players on the US national team don't get recruited by the top Euro clubs, either justified or not (they don't care if Donovan scored 3 goals vs. Honduras). OTOH, Duke players who come from an elite system and face top competition each season usually aren't top NBA prospects, probably due to lack of great physical skills and superstar potential.
I didn't know anything about Lin's history and looked on Wiki. He led his previously unknown HS team to a CA Div II title against a top Catholic school hoops powerhouse, and won a lot of individual honors. Stf and UCLA now "regret" not offering him a scholarship. Lin basically broke all the Ivy League hoops records, but I guess that isn't saying much. He did perform well in non-conf. games and put up 27 and 30 vs. BC and UConn. Not sure how critical those games were, and probably Lin's lack of hype and scouting made it easier for him to surprise big programs. Despite not facing much competition, some ESPN guy put him on a short list with Hayward, Vasquez, Singler, and Turner. BTW - he only got a 3.1 GPA at Harvard... pfffff.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Lin
I previously said I wouldn't consider Lin if I was an NBA GM. But now I'm tempted, not because of the typical assets, but somehow he has that intangible factor that allows him to defy his critics and surprise people. It may be just a face he puts on, but the kid acts fearless and like he belongs, despite our conventional wisdom thinking WTF is he doing being a starting PG? I can't believe how well he is handling himself. Confidence without attitude is an important trait for a star, and I think some highly touted draft picks lack it (Kwame and Darko come to mind). But we'll see how he responds when he hits the rookie wall or a prolonged slump. He thinks team first, but of course his decision making and passing need improvement. That may come with experience. Defensively he could be a liability, but D'Antoni's system doesn't really depend on that, and NY has Chandler and Amare to try to erase mistakes. Lin's game is also disruptive, which is useful. For some reason, other teams don't look comfortable when he is on the floor and hitting shots.
And then of course there is his story and cult fan following. Tonight in TOR, the fans were cheering for him as he hit the GW shot. I know it's TOR, but still. A team is still a business, so the buzz he generates is valuable. Plus other teams may be resenting Linsanity and are gunning to shut him down, so he could be a useful decoy to allow other Knicks to excel. My conspiracy theory is that Stern wants to create the NBA Tebow story, so he is throwing the games to allow Lin to succeed. The kid isn't even getting hard fouls, which is definitely what I would do to cool him off. All of this is very bizarre. NY won't make a deep playoff run even with Melo and Amare, but the Lin story should at least get scouts, GMs, and analysts to reconsider their assumptions. Coaches seem to be lumping real praise on Lin.
To be honest, I had no idea that Oakland even drafted a Mike Mitchell guy. :) I guess that shows how much the franchise wants to bury its mistake, or how much of a fan I am. Sorry that my previous emails let you to believe I held different opinions than I actually do. I have to work on my communication clarity.
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Just to clarify, of course in hindsight it's easy to say that teams should have shown more interest in Lin now that he has had some sustained high performance. But I think based on his college record and his bio, it shouldn't have been a mystery that Lin would have had some pro potential - at the minimum from the "first Asian American in the NBA" angle. But from his workouts (in one case he showed up Wall, right?) and interviews and such, a smart coach/GM could have seen Lin's disruption/intangibles potential. I just don't think they took the time, or maybe they let their biases get the better of them, or maybe they had justifiably more important personnel issues to worry about.
As you said though, it's too bad that Lin left the Warriors over money issues for a transaction that never even happened. But maybe this was the best thing for him and the league, because Lin would have never had the chance to shine on GS as he is doing with NY. The path to fame is rarely straight and predictable. Notice how I didn't say "path to greatness" though, which I doubt will apply to this guy - but you never know.
Sorry a slight correction, Lin isn't the first Asian-American in the NBA, not by a long shot. A Japanese-American played for NY as well... in 1947 (same year Jackie R joined the Dodgers)! That is a great show of post-war reconciliation (not that the guy did anything bad to the US during WWII, but you know how the prevailing racism was at the time). He was even shorter than me!
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/02/15/146888834/pro-basketballs-first-asian-american-player-looks-at-lin-and-applauds
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
Thursday, February 9, 2012
More on Freddie Mac
More on the Freddie Mac saga: http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146585726/potential-conflicts-at-freddie-mac-draw-scrutiny
NPR really isn't letting this go, and I guess they are not aware of, or refusing to acknowledge, challenges to their "betting against homeowners" accusation along the lines of the naked capitalism piece. Recently they interviewed the FHFA head DeMarco over this, and from what I could tell, the questioning was somewhat biased by NPR standards, and DeMarco's answers seemed to get cut off more often than usual (you could hear his words getting cut off fairly noticeably). When asked why Freddie invested in inverse floaters, DeMarco explained that he was trying to avoid losses to taxpayers. But he never even touched on hedging risk and portfolio diversification. I know some listeners may find that stuff boring, but NPR has tackled CDS's and other complex financial stories before. So either DeMarco totally whiffed on PR, or NPR suppressed his full explanation. A former Freddie risk management exec was interviewed in the NPR series as well, and he expressed shock and disapproval of Freddie's actions. But his job was risk mgmt! Couldn't he explain the situation, or was he worried to swim against the populist tide and be labeled a Freddie apologist crony?
So now there is sufficient buzz and anger over this that Congress is holding hearings. As you would expect, lawmakers from both sides are quite upset. But from all the hours of testimony, you would think someone would bring up the risk issue. Congress and the public are rightfully still unconvinced that the rule-making and investment arms of Freddie are sufficiently segregated, so why can't the Freddie execs explain their internal workings and safeguards to protect against COI (if they exist)? It's tough because the tighter refi and restructuring rules were rolled out before Freddie invested more heavily in inverse floaters. So one could argue that the investment side took notice of the tighter refi rules, and then made sound bets accordingly. That is technically legal and may not even be unethical. But if the investment guys were pressuring the rules guys a priori to make refi rules tougher, in anticipation of taking these inverse floater positions, then that's much worse.
I guess conservatives have ostensibly been against GSE's since even before the housing crisis (they never complained when the GSE's were making investors a ton of cash though), saying that gov't participation in markets usually ends up bad. And the progressives are outwardly hostile to anything that remotely resembles a bank, even if it is a GSE under the stewardship of a Democratic administration. So no one is on Freddie's side now, whether fully justified or not. I'm wondering if Fannie has also made investments of the same nature. Fannie is basically a twin entity, but we haven't heard anything from their end.
Interestingly, Freddie got in similar hot water in 1997 when it was discovered that they invested $340M in Phillip Morris corporate bonds just as the investigations against Big Tobacco's misdeeds were building up. When the story broke, they quickly dumped that position. Maybe this suggests that GSE's, or any gov't entity in general, shouldn't bet on the private sector. Like Solyndra and insider trading by Congress, there's just too much chance for COI, or the suspicion of COI, which these days is almost as bad. Freddie is so big, and with so much influence, that it could affect its own investments and the market as a whole if it wanted. Yes it's great when our gov't can make some capital gains to counter all the billions we lose from interest payments on our debt. But with so much COI risk, maybe the gov't should limit itself to investments only in Treasuries (basically internal lending) or CDs. Yes their return will be lower, but the chance for impropriety will be greatly reduced too. I know this is probably impractical, but I'm just saying.
NPR really isn't letting this go, and I guess they are not aware of, or refusing to acknowledge, challenges to their "betting against homeowners" accusation along the lines of the naked capitalism piece. Recently they interviewed the FHFA head DeMarco over this, and from what I could tell, the questioning was somewhat biased by NPR standards, and DeMarco's answers seemed to get cut off more often than usual (you could hear his words getting cut off fairly noticeably). When asked why Freddie invested in inverse floaters, DeMarco explained that he was trying to avoid losses to taxpayers. But he never even touched on hedging risk and portfolio diversification. I know some listeners may find that stuff boring, but NPR has tackled CDS's and other complex financial stories before. So either DeMarco totally whiffed on PR, or NPR suppressed his full explanation. A former Freddie risk management exec was interviewed in the NPR series as well, and he expressed shock and disapproval of Freddie's actions. But his job was risk mgmt! Couldn't he explain the situation, or was he worried to swim against the populist tide and be labeled a Freddie apologist crony?
So now there is sufficient buzz and anger over this that Congress is holding hearings. As you would expect, lawmakers from both sides are quite upset. But from all the hours of testimony, you would think someone would bring up the risk issue. Congress and the public are rightfully still unconvinced that the rule-making and investment arms of Freddie are sufficiently segregated, so why can't the Freddie execs explain their internal workings and safeguards to protect against COI (if they exist)? It's tough because the tighter refi and restructuring rules were rolled out before Freddie invested more heavily in inverse floaters. So one could argue that the investment side took notice of the tighter refi rules, and then made sound bets accordingly. That is technically legal and may not even be unethical. But if the investment guys were pressuring the rules guys a priori to make refi rules tougher, in anticipation of taking these inverse floater positions, then that's much worse.
I guess conservatives have ostensibly been against GSE's since even before the housing crisis (they never complained when the GSE's were making investors a ton of cash though), saying that gov't participation in markets usually ends up bad. And the progressives are outwardly hostile to anything that remotely resembles a bank, even if it is a GSE under the stewardship of a Democratic administration. So no one is on Freddie's side now, whether fully justified or not. I'm wondering if Fannie has also made investments of the same nature. Fannie is basically a twin entity, but we haven't heard anything from their end.
Interestingly, Freddie got in similar hot water in 1997 when it was discovered that they invested $340M in Phillip Morris corporate bonds just as the investigations against Big Tobacco's misdeeds were building up. When the story broke, they quickly dumped that position. Maybe this suggests that GSE's, or any gov't entity in general, shouldn't bet on the private sector. Like Solyndra and insider trading by Congress, there's just too much chance for COI, or the suspicion of COI, which these days is almost as bad. Freddie is so big, and with so much influence, that it could affect its own investments and the market as a whole if it wanted. Yes it's great when our gov't can make some capital gains to counter all the billions we lose from interest payments on our debt. But with so much COI risk, maybe the gov't should limit itself to investments only in Treasuries (basically internal lending) or CDs. Yes their return will be lower, but the chance for impropriety will be greatly reduced too. I know this is probably impractical, but I'm just saying.
Labels:
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Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Deal between states and banks on mortgages
So far, [mortgage relief] hasn't worked on a grand scale. As one person said to me, this is a slap on the wrist of the banks. It's not a fix for the housing problem. -NPR
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 02/09/business/states- negotiate-25-billion-deal-for- homeowners.html?_r=2
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/23/ 145535135/foreclosure-robo- signing-deal-worries-n-y- official?ps=rs
So I guess the states' AG's are closing in on an agreement on the big settlement with the banks over robo-signing and other improper foreclosure procedures. Considering current economic and budgetary conditions, the banks seemed to be playing the states against each other in order to get a sweeter deal. Some of the states hardest hit by foreclosures (CA, FL, NY, MA, DE) initially refused to endorse the deal because they thought the banks were getting too much immunity without sufficient investigation, and it would prevent them from launching future civil lawsuits as more evidence emerged. But critics within those states, as well as the other states already endorsing the settlement, were pressuring the holdouts to get on board. They justified the compromise by saying, "It's not a perfect deal and we're not getting everything we want, but homeowners are suffering every minute we delay and we need relief now."
States are hurting financially and are willing to drop the investigations for some chump change (the current deal sends $2.7B directly to states). At least NY and CA pushed at the eleventh hour to retain the rights to seek future damages regarding improperly formed MBS's and some criminal wrongdoing. But even if the states build strong cases on those charges, the track record suggests that banks will continue to stall, appeal, or pressure states into hasty settlements.
Despite the billions earmarked in the accord, the aid will help a relatively small portion of the millions of borrowers who are delinquent and facing foreclosure...
Another 750,000 people who lost their homes to foreclosure from September 2008 to the end of 2011 will receive checks for about $2,000. The aid is to be distributed over three years...
On average, these homeowners are underwater by $50,000 each... A recent estimate from the settlement negotiations put the average aid for homeowners at $20,000. -NYT
So the bank seizes your home illegally and you get $2K over 3 years (with discounting more like $1.93K in value)? Do they get to live in their homes again? And distressed homeowners who on average owe $50K more than their homes are currently worth are only getting $20K in assistance on average, so how much help is that really? I guess we should be grateful for any charity that the mighty banks see fit to bestow upon us, but the refi-restructuring aspect of this settlement will only help less than 15% of underwater borrowers. It clearly is not big enough to "fix" the housing market, and is just serving to help the banks sweep their past misdeeds under the rug.
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It's a pretty big bank bailout. Note how effective the Obama administration has gotten at concealing these. Orwell would be proud: a bailout of the banks presented as a victory for the homeowner. A couple little comments.
- Only about $5B of the touted $25B comes from the banks. The rest of it is coming from you and me. $3B is for refinances, which reduces the amount paid to the investor who owns the security. $17B is actually credits for principal modifications. Banks either get 1:1 credit for mods to bank-owned mortgages, or 0.5:1 mods for investor-owned mortgages. That is, instead of taking the $17B hit on their own balance sheet, they can choose to put a $34B hit to the investors they sold the mortgages off to. I wonder which one they'll choose. Since the investor is pensions, 401k's, and the taxpayer (via Fannie and Freddie), that's us paying $20B of this settlement.
- One thing we've heard a lot about is how the market for mortgage-backed securities has been very shallow since the crash. This is the usual argument for why Fannie/Freddie have to step up their purchases of mortgages, because no one else is buying them. The banks have argued that it's skittishness, or that investors don't have money, or whatever, but a big piece of it is that investors are rightfully wary of putting money into a market that they know is deeply opaque and full of chicanery. This was the big argument in favor of stock market regulation in the past, that if you have a strong SEC making the stock market transparent and legal, investors will flood into that market. The banks have done the opposite to the mortgage-backed securities market, and it should be no surprise that investors are wary. Now that investors see that $20B of settlement fees are going to get pushed down their throats, do we imagine anyone is going to be willing to buy mortgages? Expect Fannie and Freddie, and through them the taxpayer, to continue to be on the hook for this because no one wants to participate in a market that is so clearly rigged.
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Thx. I really appreciate your insights on these topics. As you said, it should tell us something when only the politicians with skin in the game are celebrating this settlement, and the homeowners and advocacy groups are mostly silent or upset. I didn't know about those accounting schemes to shift the costs to investors (us) - are any media outlets getting the word out? Then that begs the question: is it cost-effective to siphon money from taxpayers and investment funds in order to give marginal relief to a small subset of distressed borrowers, with no guarantee that the aid is sufficient to keep them in their homes? If at proper scale and price tag, I think mortgage relief is an important social priority now, and if that means investors needing to write down some of their returns, then that should be nothing new considering what we've gone through since 2008. But I'm just not sure that this is the right plan for that objective.
I totally agree - without confidence in a market (especially ones dealing in virtual capital), who the hell would want to invest? That's why savers in banana republics (and some G20 nations) prefer to keep their cash under their mattresses. Effective regulation can be GOOD for business as you intimated. It's not as bad these days, but investors have been so risk averse during this downturn that the yield on some short term Treasuries was actually negative (i.e. they would rather burn some of their money in return for safety, rather than trust the stock market or secretive banks). And as you said, now gov't & taxpayers have to hold their nose and chug more toxic assets. It's amazing that after 3+ years, we still can't effectively value these vehicles, and some banks still haven't come clean on their balance sheets (and their stock prices continue to get punished for it).
"They'll see, real estate is going to make a comeback!" - Dick Fuld (Lehman's last CEO, a week before his firm folded in 2008) in the film "Too Big to Fail"
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/23/
So I guess the states' AG's are closing in on an agreement on the big settlement with the banks over robo-signing and other improper foreclosure procedures. Considering current economic and budgetary conditions, the banks seemed to be playing the states against each other in order to get a sweeter deal. Some of the states hardest hit by foreclosures (CA, FL, NY, MA, DE) initially refused to endorse the deal because they thought the banks were getting too much immunity without sufficient investigation, and it would prevent them from launching future civil lawsuits as more evidence emerged. But critics within those states, as well as the other states already endorsing the settlement, were pressuring the holdouts to get on board. They justified the compromise by saying, "It's not a perfect deal and we're not getting everything we want, but homeowners are suffering every minute we delay and we need relief now."
States are hurting financially and are willing to drop the investigations for some chump change (the current deal sends $2.7B directly to states). At least NY and CA pushed at the eleventh hour to retain the rights to seek future damages regarding improperly formed MBS's and some criminal wrongdoing. But even if the states build strong cases on those charges, the track record suggests that banks will continue to stall, appeal, or pressure states into hasty settlements.
Despite the billions earmarked in the accord, the aid will help a relatively small portion of the millions of borrowers who are delinquent and facing foreclosure...
Another 750,000 people who lost their homes to foreclosure from September 2008 to the end of 2011 will receive checks for about $2,000. The aid is to be distributed over three years...
On average, these homeowners are underwater by $50,000 each... A recent estimate from the settlement negotiations put the average aid for homeowners at $20,000. -NYT
So the bank seizes your home illegally and you get $2K over 3 years (with discounting more like $1.93K in value)? Do they get to live in their homes again? And distressed homeowners who on average owe $50K more than their homes are currently worth are only getting $20K in assistance on average, so how much help is that really? I guess we should be grateful for any charity that the mighty banks see fit to bestow upon us, but the refi-restructuring aspect of this settlement will only help less than 15% of underwater borrowers. It clearly is not big enough to "fix" the housing market, and is just serving to help the banks sweep their past misdeeds under the rug.
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It's a pretty big bank bailout. Note how effective the Obama administration has gotten at concealing these. Orwell would be proud: a bailout of the banks presented as a victory for the homeowner. A couple little comments.
- Only about $5B of the touted $25B comes from the banks. The rest of it is coming from you and me. $3B is for refinances, which reduces the amount paid to the investor who owns the security. $17B is actually credits for principal modifications. Banks either get 1:1 credit for mods to bank-owned mortgages, or 0.5:1 mods for investor-owned mortgages. That is, instead of taking the $17B hit on their own balance sheet, they can choose to put a $34B hit to the investors they sold the mortgages off to. I wonder which one they'll choose. Since the investor is pensions, 401k's, and the taxpayer (via Fannie and Freddie), that's us paying $20B of this settlement.
- One thing we've heard a lot about is how the market for mortgage-backed securities has been very shallow since the crash. This is the usual argument for why Fannie/Freddie have to step up their purchases of mortgages, because no one else is buying them. The banks have argued that it's skittishness, or that investors don't have money, or whatever, but a big piece of it is that investors are rightfully wary of putting money into a market that they know is deeply opaque and full of chicanery. This was the big argument in favor of stock market regulation in the past, that if you have a strong SEC making the stock market transparent and legal, investors will flood into that market. The banks have done the opposite to the mortgage-backed securities market, and it should be no surprise that investors are wary. Now that investors see that $20B of settlement fees are going to get pushed down their throats, do we imagine anyone is going to be willing to buy mortgages? Expect Fannie and Freddie, and through them the taxpayer, to continue to be on the hook for this because no one wants to participate in a market that is so clearly rigged.
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Thx. I really appreciate your insights on these topics. As you said, it should tell us something when only the politicians with skin in the game are celebrating this settlement, and the homeowners and advocacy groups are mostly silent or upset. I didn't know about those accounting schemes to shift the costs to investors (us) - are any media outlets getting the word out? Then that begs the question: is it cost-effective to siphon money from taxpayers and investment funds in order to give marginal relief to a small subset of distressed borrowers, with no guarantee that the aid is sufficient to keep them in their homes? If at proper scale and price tag, I think mortgage relief is an important social priority now, and if that means investors needing to write down some of their returns, then that should be nothing new considering what we've gone through since 2008. But I'm just not sure that this is the right plan for that objective.
I totally agree - without confidence in a market (especially ones dealing in virtual capital), who the hell would want to invest? That's why savers in banana republics (and some G20 nations) prefer to keep their cash under their mattresses. Effective regulation can be GOOD for business as you intimated. It's not as bad these days, but investors have been so risk averse during this downturn that the yield on some short term Treasuries was actually negative (i.e. they would rather burn some of their money in return for safety, rather than trust the stock market or secretive banks). And as you said, now gov't & taxpayers have to hold their nose and chug more toxic assets. It's amazing that after 3+ years, we still can't effectively value these vehicles, and some banks still haven't come clean on their balance sheets (and their stock prices continue to get punished for it).
"They'll see, real estate is going to make a comeback!" - Dick Fuld (Lehman's last CEO, a week before his firm folded in 2008) in the film "Too Big to Fail"
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