Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts

Friday, December 11, 2015

Army misdiagnosed and kicked out thousands of mentally ill vets

Previous investigations revealed how the VA was underprepared to meet the medical needs of the War on Terror vets, and the backlog for mental health care was horrendous.

Not sure if it's related, but a new study found that the Army systematically under-diagnosed soldiers with "adjustment disorder" rather than PTSD/depression (a vague classification from the Vietnam era that suggests a soldier is *temporarily* experiencing poor emotional/behavioral symptoms after a deployment). The former implied that the soldier was unable to perform his/her duties stateside and should be dishonorably discharged (i.e. it's the soldier's fault). However, if they were diagnosed with PTSD/depression, that is considered a debilitation due to their military service (i.e. it's the war's fault), which is an honorable discharge that guarantees lifetime free medical care for themselves, spouse, and kids (equivalent to losing a leg or an eye).

That Vietnam vets site above suggested that the military "saved" $12B on medical/disability payments for Vietnam vets who were misdiagnosed.

In many cases, suffering vets got both civilian and Army psych evals. The civilian diagnosis was depression, but the Army diagnosis disagreed (even after reviewing the civilian diagnosis). It's possible that the civilian doctors were sometime wrong, but not to the tune of two thousand independent cases.

Since 2009, the Army has also kicked out 22,000 vets for various misconduct. But when a soldier has PTSD/depression, that increases the likelihood that they will fall into a misconduct situation (dereliction of duties, fighting, substance abuse, etc.). So we're not sure how many of the 22K were misdiagnosed, but I would bet it's at least a third. There is now a Congressional inquiry about this issue due to NPR's reporting.

You can't get a mortgage unless you can prove that you can afford it. We shouldn't go to war unless we can prove that we need to, we are likely to win, and our gov't can and will handle the costs.

Thursday, March 19, 2015

A good (but depressing) interview about Pakistan and Afghanistan

I didn't listen to the whole thing, but the guest had a lot of no-BS, compelling comments about the dire situation in that region. She also stressed the economic and foreign policy angles of the conflict (often ignored by the MSM), such as:

  • How do we expect the current Afghan gov't to survive when the US set it up in such a bloated model that it can only afford to pay 25% of its staff (and a regime that can't pay its people will surely collapse)? To make matters worse, global donors are reneging on their aid promises (understandably). Plus there's the lingering handicap of exceptional corruption.
  • Why are we not asking China and India to get more involved in Afghanistan, as they have huge interests at stake and could serve as a check against Pakistan and Islamists? Instead we support/enable Pakistan, whose interests are pretty much diametrically opposed to ours?
  • The Afghan national police and army are basically warlords and militias in uniform. When NATO leaves and things start to devolve, those fighters will pretty much fragment and return to the pre-2001 invasion state.

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

With friends like these...



http://www.npr.org/2013/09/25/225858836/u-s-soldier-crusading-for-afghan-interpreter-who-saved-his-life

Maybe you have heard about this story. The US sometime has the rep for "burning" foreign allies during the Cold War when it made political sense. But in the asymmetrical War on Terror, we have the resource advantage and there's no reason to turn our backs on the people who risked everything to help us - because they actually believed that we would make their countries better.

We're not talking about hundreds of thousands of refugees like Syria here (though it would be principled to do more so poor Jordan and Turkey don't have to bear the whole burden). I doubt the total is higher than a thousand Afghan and Iraqi translators and their families. In some cases, they directly saved American lives, which is more than most US citizens can say about patriotism.

A few years ago, Congress passed a law to grant visas to these folks because they will be in mortal danger once US forces leave. This isn't exaggerated speculation, as many of them have already received death threats (it's no secret that they are "infidel sympathizers" as they stood with US forces in public view). And we know that Taliban and AQ in Iraq types know how to make people disappear in the night.

But years later, only 12% of approved Afghans and 22% of Iraqis have made it to the safety of US shores, mostly because of DHS and State Dept immigration BS that these folks could be potential security risks. Yes it is true that there has been plenty of "green on blue" violence in Afghanistan where infiltrators masked as allies have killed UN forces. But those were fresh recruits in a warzone without much vetting. It's another story for an infiltrator to masquerade as an embedded translator, risk life and limb for years, and then travel to America just hurt us. If any of you know immigrants, you have probably heard stories about what a pain in the ass the background check is. Just imagine how it is for people from unstable Muslim nations. In some cases, the Taliban found out that some translators were getting out, so they may have made false "anonymous tips" to the US embassy that those people were actually threats. And all of a sudden their visas are on hold again.

The problem with bureaucrats is they fixate on the letter of the law rather than the intent and the bigger picture. I am sure none of them wants to be responsible for giving a terrorist a visa, but is that worth condemning our friends? At least transport them to Gitmo or a midwest jail until they are fully cleared. But we can't just leave them behind. And we wonder why they hate us?

Similar to the story of Sydney Shanberg, one soldier (Capt. Zeller) has tried tirelessly to get his translator Shinwari out of Afghanistan, after that man saved his life in the field and they became "brothers". He went to the media, wrote Congressmen, and just when it looked like it was going to work out, more visa delays. Now Zeller has lost contact with Shinwari, and he hopes he just went into hiding with his family rather than something worse. 

Monday, July 25, 2011

More consequences of climate change

http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=11-P13-00029&segmentID=3

We know about rising sea levels, drought, and heat waves (going on as we speak). Ocean acidification and species extinction are also big problems too. But how about global warming's effects on human conflicts?

One example is opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. We keep trying to persuade Afghans to stop growing the smack that helps fund Taliban activities and sickens Westerners. We even offer them cash incentives to switch to less lucrative but legal crops like grains. But Afghanistan is currently experiencing its worst prolonged drought in recorded history. Poppies are way more drought resistant than the crops we and the Karzai regime are pushing for. Poor farmers just want to survive. The US is saying no to their livelihood, and the Taliban are saying yes. Even if they don't believe in Sharia and don't wish for America's destruction, what side do you think they're going to support? So climate change is directly impeding our national security strategy. Some may think that buying foreign oil funds terrorism. They may be right, but burning oil of any origin is also making it harder for us to fight terrorism.

Another example closer to home is Mexican immigration. Rising sea temp and El Nino in the 1990s created a massive, toxic algae bloom that wiped out highly productive fisheries in Michoacan and elsewhere. This put a lot of poor, young people out of work and hungry, so of course many migrated north for survival, despite the dangers of crossing into America and the hard life that awaited. Some were probably desperate and more amenable to participate in drug trafficking and violence. So climate change also exacerbated an economic and security crisis for us and the Mexicans.

Unfortunately climate change will hit the people living near the equator the hardest, who also generally happen to be the poorest humans on Earth, partly due to the repercussions of colonialism and Western exploitation. But you don't see a big effort in rich nations to help them cope, especially during the global recession. This is doubly insulting because our pollution and our direct or indirect destruction of their precious forests are the major contributions to the human side of climate change. Instead, rich nations seem to be taking the approach depicted in the disaster film "2012". High walls and lifeboats for those who can afford it, and the rest are left to face nature's fury on their own. Immigration policies and border security are getting tougher in most G8 nations (that happen to be in more northern, temperate zones). Of course there are other reasons for this besides climate change effects, but clearly no one is getting more welcoming. Plenty will die from climate change in the G8 as well (some as we speak), but proportionally much less. If we made certain political decisions, the suffering and death could be greatly reduced, but Washington can't even agree to extend its own credit line, so the prospects of worldwide cooperation don't look great.

More on living with more extreme weather due to climate change: http://www.npr.org/2011/07/25/138601271/weather-warnings-for-a-climate-changed-planet

Monday, August 16, 2010

Problems with US exceptionalism

From a retired Army colonel and now professor at Boston Univ.

http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201008121000

After WWII, the US was the only industrial power that wasn't decimated by the conflict, so it made sense for us to exert global leadership in rebuilding the world (in our image) and establishing the UN to enforce justice and resolve conflicts peacefully. But maybe that privileged victor status went to our heads, and 60 years later we and some allies now act in defiance of the UN, and routinely engage in wars of choice, not "just wars" of last resort. Although we are a big, omnipresent target, the 50 states of America have not really been threatened militarily since Pearl Harbor, apart from four suicide airliners. Why do we still feel the duty/destiny/entitlement to "make the world a better place" through projection of military and economic might, especially when most of our efforts have caused more harm than good for the majority of those affected? Hindsight is 20/20, but some signs at the time indicated that unchecked communist domination and their nuclear destruction of Western society was not really likely. Yet we designed and executed an aggressive Cold War foreign policy assuming that all the world's reds were unified and committed to our demise. It wasn't just about peace-loving Americans reluctantly forced to contain dangerous commies, it was about us actively defeating our rivals to achieve global superiority ourselves. But of course we couldn't go overboard, or the Soviets would launch their nukes, so we conducted limited or proxy wars. Then came the Vietnam wake-up call, but unfortunately America's post-Vietnam leaders were the very people who didn't suffer from the war, didn't understand the war, and instead re-wrote its narrative in order to continue a flawed US interventionist strategy endorsed by the military-industrial complex. So that led us to the Iranian Revolution, Israel-Palestine impasse, Latin American civil wars, Afghanistan (2X), and Iraq (3X). We weren't 100% to blame for those situations, but we didn't really play a helpful role either.

What is worrisome is that "constant war" now seems to be the price we pay for trying to free the world. If it's not the Soviets, it's the Latin drug cartels, the Eastern European gangsters, African warlords, the few remaining commies, or "Islamo-fascists." We are rehashing the exact same insincere rhetoric, and forcing our "professional volunteer military" to work overtime (to the point of exhaustion and suicide for some) because we can't allow a bunch of turban-heads to undermine our global standing. We have more soldiers and bases overseas than protecting our shores. But our Middle East failures have demonstrated that even we cannot always bend others to our will, we don't have all the solutions worked out, and the world is really complex and maybe impervious to sudden external improvement, even with our huge resources. And we've paid an even bigger price, since beyond our military casualties and expenditures, we've made the price of crude quadruple, poisoned international diplomacy for years, and our massive debt has compromised progress on most other national priorities. Those factors have only served to strengthen our rivals too. Plus our military actions have created new enemies and dispersed formerly more concentrated, conspicuous threats. The Times Square and underpants bombers probably would be living normal, lawful lives now if we made different war decisions.

I know that we can't just bury our heads in the sand and ignore global problems/injustices, but there are less expensive and destructive ways to approach them. If we really want to make the world a better place, half of war is rooted in poverty, economic injustice, and lack of law/education. We can easily invest in development projects that alleviate those global problems and reduce the likelihood of conflict, which will also create economic opportunities for Americans and score us diplomatic/humanitarian points. And for the hardcore violent people out there who are bent on hurting us and others out of twisted hateful ideology, surveillance, defensive measures, and surgical anti-terror missions may be more effective than occupying entire nations. Cheap, easy cyber-monitoring of communications and money wires have prevented more terrorism than our entire war in Iraq, and no one had to die. Lastly, if we improve our own ethics and conduct, and eliminate some of our offensive, unjust practices, that will go far to advance our supposed goals of global peace and freedom.

Bottom line, we have to learn to let go. Humanity and the world have gotten on just fine without America for 99.99999% of history. There's no natural law dictating that humans must shape the world in our image, that a benevolent superpower must maintain order in the world, and that the power must be us. We are barely in control of our own checkbooks; how can we expect to control the world and its 6B diverse inhabitants? US exceptionalism is a hard ideology to wean off; we all were indoctrinated in grade school and every election cycle. We feel noble and proud to be the vanguards of global freedom, white knights standing up for everything that's good. While others cower and capitulate, we confront the dark forces of the world. Mass media really exploits this, and I'll admit that I wanted to join the military as a kid, and more recently was a little moved by Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech at the time. We beat King George, the Apaches, the slave masters, the fascists, and the Soviets. We made the world safe for democracy and capitalism, and we can do anything we set our minds to. Yes we have done some good along the way, but did we have the right to drastically alter the lives of so many, and was it worth the steep price some had to pay for our ambitions?

Even our educated, perceptive, 21st Century President Obama is not immune. In his famous, jubilant election victory speech in Chicago, he asked Americans to help him "put our hands on the arc of history, and bend it once more towards the hopes of a better day." What hubris, even if we really have all the best intentions. It is true that the US has the power to write, or end, history any time we want. But will it be for the good of the few people in power, or the greater good? Sometimes the best thing we can do is nothing, and our world will never be free of evil and violence. That doesn't mean we shouldn't stop trying to be good global citizens, and we do have the serious responsibility to use our vast power and wealth for good. So let's think very hard about the ways to do that properly and successfully, instead of rushing to assert ourselves in every single conflict that threatens our prestige, and masking it with some noble crusade rhetoric.

Friday, July 30, 2010

Bad war news all around

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100727/ap_on_bi_ge/ml_iraq

So the IRS is up our asses for every last dollar, and persecutes poor people for taking liberties with the earned income tax credit (http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-government/10246878-1.html). But I guess the Pentagon has fallen victim to the moral hazard of managing other people's money that they're not accountable for. Jeez, just hire some temps from Accenture or something. They can call in high-tech drone air strikes from 15,000 miles away, but can't use TurboTax? For such a regimented, hierarchical organization as our military, how can there be no oversight and leadership on something so major as Iraq reconstruction funds? I guess that's another example why soldiers shouldn't moonlight as "nation builders". We all have our roles, talents, and limitations.

Also, what do you guys think about the Afghanistan war Wikileaks? Good or bad for the NATO effort and our democracy? Definitely bad for US-Pakistan relations, which may not necessarily be a bad thing. Wikileaks founder Assange predicted that one day his org would have "blood on its hands" (but feels that it's worth it to expose government-military crimes and deception), and Washington is threatening that it may happen now, maybe to discourage future leakers and control the damage. Civilians and the media don't need to know about sensitive real-time operational info (like how stupid Geraldo and Faux News exposed US troop positions and were then expelled from Iraq by the Pentagon: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/international/worldspecial/01MEDI.html), but if the war is so justly and properly executed, why the need to hide it from us? They wouldn't even let us film returning caskets until recently. We all know that mistakes abound in wars and even allies quarrel, so why do they feel the need to project the illusion of perfection and harmony to us? They must really think we're that stupid. I understand the desire to maintain soldier morale and public war support, but getting caught in an embarrassing scandal is bad for morale too.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100727/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_afghanistan_wikileaks

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All information from the wikileaks was redacted to protect sources and the data released was at least 7 months old so there was no risk of releasing sensitive information.

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Yeah I think that is an unlikely risk as well (considering all the other ways you can be burnt in the intel game, even by your own leaders - Valerie Plame for example), but the gov't is desperate to discredit the act. Assange was smart to "re-leak" the info through the NYT, Guardian, and Der Spiegel because those org's would diligently check the content and only publish what passed their legal dept's. It's ironic because Assange has previously lambasted the mainstream media, since they often also have access to Wikileaks' secret content, sources, and more, but are too "cowardly" to bring it into the light.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Gen. McChrystal running his mouth

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100622/ap_on_en_ot/us_mcchrystal_enemies
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236

Like the unprecedented shame of the current French World Cup soccer squad, I guess this is what happens when you let your ego convince you that you are bigger than the mission and the country. For a military commander, I understand that playing diplomat at black-tie events and sucking up to politicians (because they control your resources) can be annoying and not really in your job description. But disrespecting civilian leaders and foreign partners won't help your cause, and will probably undermine public support and military morale. Modern generals have to be worldly gentlemen and not tabacky-spitting, ass-kicking macho men. Well I suppose they have to be both at times, but I'd rather trust a commander who speaks sparingly and uses his brain (rather than the other head), than a prima donna crooning for the cameras. Unfortunately, the US military seems to have produced too many of the latter over our history (Patton, MacArthur, LeMay, Schwartzkopf), and too few of the humbler Bradley/Eisenhower types. Because when your ego and ambition are out of control, what's to stop you from putting your soldiers or innocent civilians in danger for your own career gains and power trips? It's really sad that we need to keep reminding our "civil servants" to put the country first.

If he had any honor, McChrystal should step down. Not just for these comments, but also for lack of progress in Afghanistan, and I don't think things will radically improve by next summer (winter makes large coordinated military operations nearly impossible over there, so they have 4 fewer months to work with). Remember the first surge operation in Marja that was touted as a great success? Now that some US forces have moved on to prepare for the Kandahar offensive, Marja has slipped back to partial Taliban control (and insurgents may have shot down a NATO chopper yesterday). We can't be everywhere at once, and the Afghan troops aren't up to task and probably never will be - at least enough to secure their nation to a level of our liking. Heck even the more advanced, institutional, and better funded Pakistani military can't control its Taliban.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060906214.html

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"You're leading by example. That's what we do. Particularly when it's really, really hard, and it hurts inside" - Gen. McChrystal

To be fair to the general, McChrystal's big shot friends and foes involved in the Afghan war may also be egomaniacs and opportunists with their own agendas, so it's not like he's a tyrant and everyone else are victimized lambs. The degenerate, dysfunctional soap opera that was Hitler's inner circle and Nazi High Command during WWII seems to be the rule, not the exception, for wartime leadership bodies (look at Bush's war room with Cheney, Wolfowitz, Condi, Rummy, and Powell being like the only sane one). Some are jealous and resentful of McChrystal's rapid rise to fame (deserved or not), and that may be biasing their views. And I think we'd all agree that it is the biggest pain in the ass possible to wage war under the framework of a vague NATO coalition with a million different opinions, complaints, and special interests to please. NATO doesn't have great nation-building expertise, and Afghanistan is 100X more challenging than the Balkans. But hey, no one invited NATO to come.

If McChrystal's data and experience lead him to believe that Obama et al. are truly wrong on various war issues, he has the right to feel that way and express himself consistent with his military duties and obligations. But so far, McChrystal has "won" the debate and gotten almost all he asked for, so why would he need to bitch to the media? Though he got what he needed by playing dirty - initially Obama/Biden were hesitant to escalate the war, so McChrystal and the Pentagon sensed that and "leaked" a memo to the press, basically warning of doomsday unless he gets 40,000 more boots, which more or less forced Obama's hand for fear of looking weak on defense. After that, McChrystal doesn't have the right to get mad at his former commander, Ambassador Eikenberry, for doing the same and questioning the war strategy in a leaked cable. Well, it's now on McChrystal to prove he's right, but I wonder how many more people will die before he feels vindicated or just gives up. Maybe McChrystal is singing like a canary now as insurance in case his counterinsurgency-development strategy fails, so then he can say that others were fighting him all the way, preventing him from getting the job done. Maybe he'd be right, but maybe this move will make defeat more likely. Or maybe this hoopla is way overblown. I'm sure the Taliban doesn't care and doesn't read Rolling Stone. I wonder how our troops will react. They will probably side with their commander, but his example can't be good for military focus and professionalism. 

The RS article said that McChrystal was the son of a general, which probably helped him overcome his 298/855 ranking at West Point, despite being very sharp physically and mentally. He was top of his class in one area: over 100 hours of demerits for poor behavior. During the 2003 Iraq invasion, he was a Pentagon spokesman, not a field commander. Later his office was responsible for the lie/error claiming that Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire, not by friendlies, and there were reports of detainee abuse at Camp Nama in Iraq in 2006, which was under his command. Yet strangely, it was like his poop didn't stink, and Washington and the media gave him a pass during his confirmation hearings for the top Afghan job. Maybe they were so desperate to have a white knight rescue us from the quagmire. But what probably helped his rise was his time leading JSOC in Iraq (basically black ops), and his people were responsible for killing the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi. He is known for modernizing Ranger training and using cyber-geeks to help hunt terrorists. But currently as head of ISAF, the troops resent McChrystal's strategies and new restrictions on using deadly force. It's a tough balancing act - using enough violence to scare and beat the Taliban, but restraining yourself so as to not incur more civilian casualties and the political blowback, which unfortunately puts NATO troops in more harm. It's a delicate approach that may not be viable in practice, and the soldiers seem frustrated and confused about it.

Monday, June 14, 2010

Massive mineral deposits found in Afghanistan

Oh, so that's why the war is "worth fighting for": http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?no_interstitial

Afghanistan is flush with iron, copper, gold, and rare expensive metals used in electronics. Soviet geologists first discovered some of the deposits during their failed occupation. Some Afghans retained their survey maps, which caught the attention of a USGS development team after our invasion. We conducted our own aerial surveys in 2006-7 which confirmed the mineral riches, but didn't act on the data until a Pentagon business development unit (that formerly worked in Iraq) got hold of it in 2009.

There are quite a few challenges, mind you, before Afghanistan becomes the "Saudi Arabia" of metals though. Some of the richest deposits are found in the hostile border regions near Pakistan, where even the NATO forces won't venture into. The deposits require heavy equipment and well trained workers to extract, and may be situated in tough mountainous terrain. Currently Afghanistan lacks even a km of railroad, and has no mining infrastructure (or really any modern infrastructure), so it would take decades of development and billions of foreign investment before they are ready. Yet as we have seen in Nigeria and other unstable oil nations, static industrial targets are easy pickings for insurgents and thieves. If they can attack NATO and UN compounds at will, they can easily disrupt mining production with sabotage or mere threats to workers. We know that we won't really pacify Afghanistan no matter how many surges we send. So if the price is right to justify mining there despite the risks, our security presence will probably need to be permanent, like our bases in the Gulf states. 

Another confounding factor is minerals-thirsty China. Although Afghanistan is "our project", the Chinese have already made their presence known by bribing and winning the rights to mine copper in some areas. So it's almost assured that the US and China will raise tensions competing for influence. And lastly, the culture of corruption in Afghanistan would probably just intensify with a new high-value economic sector. The US is among the top 20 least corrupt nations, and look how our MMS and mine safety regulators perform.

"The corruption that is already rampant in the Karzai government could also be amplified by the new [mineral] wealth, particularly if a handful of well-connected oligarchs, some with personal ties to the president, gain control of the resources. Just last year, Afghanistan’s minister of mines was accused by American officials of accepting a $30 million bribe to award China the rights to develop its copper mine. The minister has since been replaced." -NYT

Also a very good Frontline doc summarizing our challenges in Afghanistan: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/

We're paying and pressuring the Pakistani government to help us defeat the Afghan Taliban, which is essentially the Afghan wing of the ISI. Yet an even greater regional security concern is the viability of the fragile pro-US regime in Islamabad, with its nuclear arsenal, rivalry with India, and threats from internal Islamist groups. So winning in Afghanistan means weakening our allies in Pakistan, and supporting Pakistan means condoning the Afghan Taliban. How are we supposed to resolve that paradox?

Monday, January 11, 2010

The CIA in the War on Terror


"And I think what one of the things this incident shows is just how - I mean, you could say desperate, but certainly eager - the CIA is for this kind of intelligence. He was promising kind of the big haul. He was going to give the location or at least give good intelligence about perhaps the number two operative in al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri. So the CIA brought its number two official from Kabul all the way to Khost for the meeting... I mean, [the drone bombing program is] nothing short of a war. It's a campaign going on, a military, quasi-military campaign that the CIA is carrying out and which the CIA is quite proud of, actually. They think that this is kind of the most effective thing that the U.S. government has right now to deal with al-Qaida."
- M Mazzetti, NYT nat. security correspondent

"If you have different personalities down range, everybody's worried about their rice bowls, and the next thing you know you have this kind of problem. People aren't talking to each other... I don't think we have any choice [that the CIA has to become a stronger paramilitary entity]. I do think we need to get a lot better at it. I don't think we have completed the evolution from a Cold War entity to what we need... I think it's going to take a consensus between the Congress and the president to really say we got to make some fundamental changes... We're still essentially using the same machine we had on September 10th, 2001."
- C Faddis, CIA

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Maybe you heard about the "double agent" Jordanian doctor who killed 6 CIA employees and a Jordanian Intel officer at a forward operating base in Afghanistan. Agents were supposedly trying to turn him into an asset, because he claimed to have knowledge of the location of a top Al Qaeda figure. But instead, he detonated a suicide vest during his debriefing, after he was invited to the base and not frisked. So instead of finding Zawahiri, we lost decades of cumulative intelligence expertise and called our entire human intel apparatus in that country into question. The Jordanian used to work in Palestinian refugee camps, and probably witnessed a lot of the suffering caused by the Arab-Israeli conflicts. He was a well-known anti-Western Islamic blogger too, but Jordanian Intel and the CIA seemed to think they had "de-radicalized" him, and he continued to blog just to maintain appearances.

Our new War on Terror is a bizarre chapter in the history of combat, because literally we have the conventional armed forces, private mercenaries, and the CIA all waging parallel wars and conducting independent operations in the same theater of battle. And in some cases, maybe the parties are not fully cooperating or even aware of the other's actions, but in fact are competing for targets/intel and unintentionally undermining overall strategy. Maybe you heard about reports of Blackwater Worldwide employees working with the CIA on raids in Iraq, or in some cases working on their own (under who's orders?), which has angered many in DC. Actually no different than the insurgents, the mercenaries were not trained by our government and have no legal accountability. Their only legitimacy is a contract from Baghdad (that we forced them to sign) permitting them to do business in-country until a given expiration date. Yet they are highly paid, heavily armed, and (were) pursuing high-value targets in Iraq. Since Afghanistan is even more Wild West (they don't even have a single km of railroad), I can only imagine what unauthorized activities may go unmonitored. Though due to the terrain and lack of infrastructure, aerial drones seem to be the tool of choice.

I guess a lot of the War on Terror is assassinations and intel gathering (and torture), so of course the CIA should play a prominent role, but they are also used to working without rules and oversight. They have already received some bad publicity over rendition flights, Abu Ghraib, and Gitmo, but they have probably also gathered intel (by what means, we may never know) that helped prevent some attacks on the West. Prior to our full invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, the CIA and special ops forces did heavily pursue Al Qaeda at the end of 2001 and decimate much of Osama's core members (they may have even wounded him at Tora Bora). But political hesitation and territorial disputes by Bush's cabinet stalled their advance and allowed the Al Qaeda survivors to escape to Pakistan.

Also the CIA may not have the best reputation in Afghanistan due to the events at the end of the Soviet occupation. While the CIA unofficially armed and trained the Mujahadeen, through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, to improve their insurgent capabilities (as depicted in "Charlie Wilson's War", and see my previous posting: http://worldaffairs-manwnoname.blogspot.com/2008/05/charlie-wilsons-war-and-bs-revisionist.html), after the Soviet withdrawal the US let the nation deteriorate into civil war and Islamic fundamentalism. Stemming from Vietnam, I think the US defense establishment is very sensitive about being labeled as people who abandon their friends. But the perception in Afghanistan was that the CIA was only interested in using the Muslims to spill blood fighting the rival Soviets, and afterward the US couldn't care less about their problems.

I have no doubt that many in the CIA are dedicated patriots with great talent for their difficult job, and they have saved American lives over the years. But they also have that reputation (deservedly in some cases) of just using people to accomplish their narrow objectives. As depicted in films like "Spy Game", "Syriana", and "Body of Lies", the CIA are arrogant, cocksure, scheming, pathologically ambitious, and uncaring. Flesh and blood people become expendable "assets", little respect is shown to allies, pissing contests abound, and the mission always comes first despite what broken laws or collateral damage may ensue. Obviously Hollywood's depiction is sensational, but also plays out in reality: the Iran-Contra scandal, and more recently Extraordinary Rendition, and just last year 2 high-level employees were dismissed for a sex scandal and corruption.

If many Americans are already suspicious of the CIA after Watergate and whatnot, just imagine how the rest of the world, and specifically parts of the Muslim world caught in our wars, feel about the CIA. I know it is a dirty job and the CIA works with lying, treacherous scumbags. You use me and I use you. I think we all accept that as part of the spy game, but then they shouldn't expect locals to go out of their way to help us, especially when helping us could be viewed as a betrayal of their faith and heritage. They know that we don't give a hoot about them, and when they are no longer useful to us, we will cut them loose (like all the Iraqi translators who risked their lives and their families to help us, and we don't even compensate their next of kin with money or visas after they are killed). Potential assets and their affiliates also know that we are very interested in them, which may leave us vulnerable as we saw in Afghanistan. Many foreign intelligence agencies that we work with also probably know that the CIA looks down on them and won't share much useful information. In a more public example, our close ally Italy has issued warrants for the arrests of several CIA operatives relating to the kidnapping of an Islamic cleric in Italy. Though there probably was a secret NATO agreement to permit CIA agents to "do their thing" in Europe, Italian laws were broken. Everyone's a liar and there is no trust; actually it's a miracle that anyone can get reliable human intel these days. Maybe the CIA officers who were killed by the Jordanian bomber were so ambitious to get credit for assassinating some Al Qaeda big shot, that they ignored their better judgment and suspicions about him. Obviously they violated base security protocol to allow the bomber to do such damage, and we may never know what really happened.

But tragic events such as this, or the public burning of private security guards in Iraq a few years ago, should show that occupied peoples do not approve of some of our methods. I would hope that the Cold War taught us that it's wrong for global powers to meddle in Third World nations and treat their people like chess pawns in a high-stakes power game. True alliances and partnerships are built on honesty and respect. That is why I am dubious of our uniquely intimate alliance with Israel, since Israel doesn't seem to heed our concerns very often (calls to end heavy shelling in Gaza or settlement building in the Occupied Territories often go ignored), and Mossad agents are occasionally caught spying in the US. If that is how Israel treats its closest friend, I wouldn't want to be her enemy. But getting back to the CIA in the War on Terror, I know a lot of the challenges they face are unprecedented. So maybe new approaches and more sensitive techniques are appropriate, instead of the same old macho spycraft. Fortunately much of our intel is gathered electronically, thereby reducing the human evil factor. I know CIA agents can't coddle terrorists and take them to tablecloth dinners (well, the Algiers station chief dismissed over his sex scandal often took assets to strip shows to turn them), but we have to move beyond turf wars and waterboarding. Many government agencies resist change or outside advice, and I think the CIA takes it to another level. After almost a decade since 9/11, they and the military still have a recruiting shortage of Arabic speakers and Mideast experts.

Expanding these points to the larger War on Terror, it is clear that there is a sea change. Domestic law enforcement apprehended more suspected terrorists (and foiled potential attacks) in 2009 than the previous 4 years combined. This coincides with increased covert drone attacks and raids on the Pakistani border that claimed to kill Al Qaeda leaders. In fact, under Obama we have killed more alleged Qaeda leaders than during Bush's last 3 years in office. So Al Qaeda is hurt badly, getting desperate, and forced to adapt. They are stepping up their plans to attack the West, and since all failed, we can only assume that they were more rushed and frantic with their planning. But another new development is that the alleged attackers were mostly non-Arabs from Al Qaeda affiliate groups. They visited Somalia or Yemen. So Al Qaeda rebuilt after 9/11 and gained enough strength to destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan in recent years. But now they are getting hit harder, and forced to go underground again. But they are sending their people to friendly organizations in other parts of the world under less US scrutiny. And that seems to be where this new breed of attacker is emerging from. This illustrates the problem with counter-terrorism and unconventional war in this globalized world. We might smash the vase, but the fragments of porcelain spread everywhere and slip through our fingers. So now we have a bigger mess on our hands. Maybe it was better when Al Qaeda was more complacent and contained in the Pakistan border areas. Just like our mistake with Saddam and Iraq, sometimes it's better to tolerate a monster in a cage, then try to completely destroy that monster and create dozens of new ones.

" 'In essence, these [Al Qaeda] operatives are being sent out as force multipliers, to plus up or strengthen or to enhance the capabilities of local and region allies,' says [Georgetown Univ. security expert B Hoffman]. He believes they are attempting to 'overwhelm the U.S. and other enemies with a strategy that amounts to death by 1,000 cuts.' "
-NPR

So even though we lucked out on Christmas, we can't be lucky forever. Maybe we should rethink our tactics, because a minimal, contained, centralized terror threat, while worse than an absence of terrorism, is much better than a dispersed, multiplying terror threat.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122436089
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122319659
http://www.defpro.com/news/details/12317/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Afghanistan
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/10/AR2009121004700.html?wprss=rss_politics
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/19/AR2009031904134.html
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/1/12/worldupdates/2010-01-12T023641Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-453165-1&sec=Worldupdates
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6732897.stm

Friday, December 11, 2009

Obama's Nobel speech


From Obama's Nobel acceptance speech in Norway this week:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/80410.html
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121304855

First of all, it's probably a really bad sign when Sarah Palin praises your speech on war, peace, and realism vs. idealism.
http://www.twincities.com/politics/ci_13970425?source=rss

Commentary from Newsweek's chief political correspondent, Howard Fineman:

Well, I said in many ways that's true. Yes, the tone [of Obama's speech] was humble. Yes, it was philosophical. Yes, it was complex. He talked about negotiations and banning torture and so forth, the importance of diplomacy. But I was struck, as somebody who covered the Bush administration, by how fundamentally he accepted some of the premises of George W. Bush's view of the world - the existence of evil. The president used the word terrorism several times. That's a word he's avoided in some recent speeches. He said no jihad could ever be a just war. No holy war could ever be just, but he said that in essence the war in Afghanistan was. Those are all notes I think that George W. Bush might well have struck.

In his very long speech, Obama once again showed that he is really gifted in articulating what every high school freshman should vaguely and abstractly know about war, humanity, and morality. He never really communicated how America's current wars (that he is continuing instead of ending) will lead to more peace in the future, vs. other less violent security precautions. He spoke in absolutes like Bush - a pacifist world where dictators can push us around because they know we will appease, vs. the "real world" with ugly war. But of course America only fights when it's just and necessary (even though he and everyone else have already admitted that Iraq didn't qualify). The problem with his and Bush's "just war" argument is that even if a war's cause is just, its prosecution is always messy and fraught with abuses. War is too confusing and humans are too flawed to conduct a just war justly. That's why we must seriously try (and try harder than we are!) to avoid any war, no matter the moral spin. Sure even Palin would say that America hates when it must march to war, but our track record suggests otherwise.

Obama said that no holy war can ever be just, which is true. We already know about the crazy Crusaders and the crazy Muslim terrorists, but what about America's holy war of Manifest Destiny that helped the US become a world power? Wasn't it our divine right or White Man's Burden to put blacks to work for no pay and conquer the lands between the two oceans, by displacing, raping, or killing any natives or Spaniards in our way? Or how about the Monroe Doctrine that basically compels our government to militarily intervene in small conflicts in the Western Hemisphere any time foreign "colonialism" is suspected? How hypocritical to claim to combat colonialism with colonialism. What about "Remember the Maine" when we declared a vengeful war against Spain (just like Afghanistan) that was actually a territory grab (we got the Phillipines and Gitmo). We had to attack Spain to prevent them from attacking us again, right? And it wasn't even proven that Spain sank the Maine, just as we have very sketchy evidence linking the Taliban to 9/11.

Even the most just war of them all, WWII, ended with American bombs massacring over a million defenseless Japanese civilians who were not at Pearl Harbor and who meant us no future harm. Japan was already on its knees and possibly ready to capitulate, but we had to nuke them twice anyway, just to flex our muscles to the Soviets that East Asia is ours. Obama also claimed that the fall of the USSR signaled a great victory for freedom and self-determination, and of course our side won. No one misses the USSR, but how exactly did freedom win the day when American forces slaughtered millions (or backed dictators who did) in Korea, Southeast Asia, and Latin America in the process? How did those "just wars" lead to the Soviet collapse and help people win their freedom? And if the Cold War was all about freedom and human rights, then why after the wall came down did American businessmen penetrate the former Soviet satellites faster than US aid and diplomats?

To me, the worst war is not the horrible Jihadi actions of Osama, Zarqawi, and his kind (they are bad but not the worst), but instead the much bloodier and deceptive large-scale Western-perpetrated war wrapped in the flag of freedom and peacekeeping. If Obama understands this, he didn't articulate it during his many war-themed speeches this year, which is moral cowardice on his part. And no coward deserves the Nobel. As one of only 3 US presidents who have received this prize, I think Obama not only missed a precious chance, but also shirked his moral duty (and better judgment as a thinking man), to cut the crap about America always being the noble world savior, and come clean about our past abuses and ulterior/selfish motives for war that relate more to power than security. We're in the 21st Century now, and many world polls show that people think America is a bigger threat to world security than Russia or Iran. Obviously, the rhetoric only goes so far and even slick Obama won't be able to persuade others who can see the writing on the wall, even if we refuse to out of "patriotism". I think we would make more friends and marginalize our enemies better by coming clean rather than perpetuating the status quo. We are America, and we do err and sin too.

Obama gave token credit to peace figureheads MLK (Obama would not be president if it wasn't for MLK) and Gandhi, and excused himself from their tenets because he is a head of state and commander-in-chief, so he doesn't have the luxury of idealistic pacifism. Maybe that is true, but Gandhi was also a political leader in the newly-formed India (albeit not a very good politician - not a profession for a decent man). When Hindu-Muslim tension turned to street violence after independence, did Gandhi crack down on them in the name of national security? And did he side with his fellow Hindus against the outsider Muslims? No, he staged a hunger strike and prayed for both sides. That sent such a powerful message, and because of his great reputation, the warring groups took just 5 days to broker a ceasefire, because they loved Gandhi and his life meant more than their conflict. Gandhi didn't have to make a single threat or send a single young soldier to kill or be killed to restore peace. That is what leadership is all about. Plus, Gandhi was eventually killed by a Hindu radical, not a Muslim. He was betrayed by his own people, like Rabin. That should remind us that the greatest threats to the state are usually internal (like the lobbyist-Congress revolving door, and right wing radio nuts), not Taliban bogeymen hiding in caves. I know Obama fasting will not stop Al Qaeda from fighting us, but maybe if America acted more like Gandhi in the last 100 years, Al Qaeda would have never been created.

"America's commitment to global security will never waver," Obama said. I guess that's why we have done or continue to do next to nothing positive for the tense, unjust, and/or atrocious situations in Burma, Kampuchea, Rwanda, Congo, Korea, Iraq (when Saddam was killing Kurds), Sudan, Georgia, Israel/Palestine, and such? In fact, our pro-Israel actions in the UN have prolonged wars and suffering there. We fight when we want to increase our influence, and when our economic interests are at risk. Sure that may coincide with humanitarian concerns, but that is obviously not our chief priority. We're just like any other army or state (actually worse than most), and not anointed with some higher moral status. So cut the crap Obama, or you really are the foreign policy infant that the GOP and Hillary labeled you as during the campaign.

We're stuck with Afghanistan now because we can't change the past. But our role is really janitor instead of policeman. We are obligated to try to fix the mess we've caused (huge poppy production, Taliban resurgence, spillover to Pakistan, etc.), and then get the hell out.

More Afghanistan concerns (some already mentioned in the last email):

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/12/01/afghanistan_surge/index.html

Top Ten things that Could Derail Obama's Afghanistan Plan
1. Obama's plan depends heavily on training 100,000 new soldiers and 100,000 new policemen over the next three years. It has taken 8 years to train the first 100,000 soldiers fairly well, and the same period for the Europeans to train a similar number of police badly. Can the pace really be more than doubled and quality results still obtained?

2. Obama's plan assumes that there can be a truly national Afghan army. But the current one is disproportionately Tajik and signally lacks troops from the troubled Helmand and Qandahar provinces. Unless the ethnic tensions are eased, training a big army could well provoke an anti-Tajik backlash in Pashtun regions that feel occupied.

3. Obama's goal to "break the Taliban's momentum" may well fail. Only 20 percent of insurgencies in modern times are defeated in a decisive military manner.

4. The US counter-insurgency plan assumes that Pashtun villagers dislike and fear the Taliban, and just need to be protected from them so as to stop the politics of intimidation. But what if the villagers are cousins of the Taliban and would rather support their clansmen than white Christian foreigners?

5. Obama is demanding that Pakistan help destroy the Taliban movement, a historical ally of Pakistan in Afghanistan. While Pakistan now has good reason to attempt to wipe out the Pakistani Taliban Movement, which has committed a good deal of terrorism against the country, Islamabad has no reason to attack the Afghan guerrilla groups fighting Karzai. They are fellow Muslims, and are Pashtuns (as are 12 percent of Pakistanis), and dislike India. The Northern Alliance elements in the Karzai government, which have recently grown stronger, are pro-India. Obama is asking Pakistan to betray its national interests, which is not realistic in the absence of some much bigger carrot than a few billion dollars in foreign aid.

6. Obama asserts that although the Afghan presidential election was marked by fraud, the results (the victory of Hamid Karzai) are legitimate within the constitutional framework. But isn't it possible that Karzai has decisively lost legitimacy among broad sections of the Afghan public, wounding him as a partner in working for a recognition of the legitimacy of a greatly expanded foreign occupation army in the country?

7. Obama is demanding accountability from cabinet members in Afghanistan and offering agricultural and economic aid. But 15 present and former cabinet members are under investigation for massive embezzlement, and 7 key ministries were only able to spend 40% of their budget allocation last year. Isn't Obama counting on a culture of official probity and a governmental capacity that simply does not exist in Kabul? What happens when there is more cabinet-level corruption and when the Ministry of Agriculture once again just can't spend the money Obama gives it?

8. Obama assumes that the US is not fighting a broadbased insurgency in Afghanistan. This assumption is true in the sense that there is zero support for Taliban or Sunni extremists among Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and a majority of Pashtuns. But if we looked at the equivalent of counties in Helmand, Qandahar and some other Pashtun provinces, we might find substantial swathes of territory where the insurgency is in fact broadly based. Moreover, Pashtun guerrillas can count on a certain amount of sympathy from other Pashtuns in their struggle against foreign forces-- including the 20-some million Pashtuns of Pakistan. If the issue is not the "cancer" of extremist ideology, but a form of religious Pashtun anti-imperialism, then that could be the basis for a broadly based movement.

9. Obama maintains that the "Taliban" have in recent years made common cause with "al-Qaeda" in seeking to overturn the Karzai government. But although the Taliban control 10-15% of Afghanistan, there are no al-Qaeda operatives to speak of in Afghanistan. That does not sound like much of a common cause. By confusing the Taliban with al-Qaeda, and by confusing the Taliban with other Pashtun guerrilla groups such as Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami, Obama risks making the struggle a black and white one, whereas it has strong regional, ethnic and nationalist overtones (see 8 above). Black and white struggles are much more difficult to negotiate to a settlement.

10. The biggest threat of derailment comes from an American public facing 17 percent true unemployment and a collapsing economy who are being told we need to spend an extra $30 billion to fight less than 100 al-Qaeda guys in the mountains of Afghanistan, even after the National Security Adviser admitted that they are not a security threat to the US.

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Obama's Afghanistan escalation


For the first time since 2001, according to polls, a majority of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is "not worth fighting." Fifty-seven percent of independents and nearly three-quarters of Democrats oppose the war — and overall, only 26 percent of Americans support the idea of adding more troops. Indeed, if Obama were to escalate the war, his only allies would be the Pentagon, Congressional Republicans, an ultraconservative think tank called the Foreign Policy Initiative, whose supporters include Karl Rove, Sarah Palin and a passel of neoconservatives and former aides to George W. Bush.
- R Dreyfuss, Rolling Stone Oct. 28

I was disappointed with our Nobel Peace Prize laureate's rhetoric during this week's Afghanistan speech (he plans to send in 30,000 more Marines for ~18 months, many straight from Iraq, which must be demoralizing for their families). NATO may add 5-10,000 troops too, but I am skeptical. He can argue that this course of action is the best choice of dismal options, and remind us that he inherited this conflict, but don't feed us the same tired War on Terror crap. Public opinion is majority against a troops surge, partially because Americans feel that Afghanistan is not "winnable", nor critical to our security anyway, and they're probably right. Even the worst-case scenario of a Talibanized Afghanistan is not like North Korea or Iran. The country is mostly illiterate, dirt poor, internally divided, and geographically isolated, like Somalia with poppies instead of pirates. They may export some petty criminals and terrorists from time to time, but their ability to do harm is greatly diminished vs. 2001.

Obama did not heed the protests of Congressional Dems, VP Biden, and Karl Eikenberry (US ambassador to Afghanistan and a retired general who served in Afghanistan from 2005-2007) in this decision. He caved to our rock star generals instead (McChrystal and Petraeus, the latter rumored to seek a run for political office, assuming we are successful in Afghanistan?). Eikenberry's protest is especially noteworthy since he was part of the McChrystal/Petraeus/Odierno clique from West Point, and Army chums place a premium on loyalty. But his experiences in-country have soured him to the possibility of working with the Karzai regime towards victory. I hope President Obama hasn't forgotten the man he was as Candidate Obama. I understand that he must represent the Office of the President now, respect the conservative mainstream, and placate Pentagon interests. But if JFK deferred to the hawks during the Cuban Missile Crisis, probably none of us would be here. Sometimes the bravest thing to do is not to fight.

Biden warned that the world will test a young, idealistic Obama the minute he assumes office, and maybe Obama wants to show the world that he is a tough war president too. Maybe he fears that weakness on Afghanistan will create an opening for the GOP in the 2010 midterms. But after 8 years of fumbling and violence in the Middle East, it's disrespectful to the American people and the people of the world for him to re-hash the same tired Bush arguments for prolonging and even escalating a frustrating war. Ironically, many of the arguments he made on the campaign trail against Bush's Iraq Surge could equally apply against him here. Change we can believe in?

First of all, we were NOT attacked on 9/11 from Afghanistan, and not a single hijacker was Afghan (or Iraqi). Osama and other Jihadists did receive sanctuary in Afghanistan from their days as fighters in the Mujahadeen against the Soviets. But the Taliban government under Mullah Omar had little inkling Al Qaeda was planning 9/11, and probably would have tried to stop them if they found out (because obviously it would trigger a Western invasion and the toppling of their fragile regime). Why do you think Sudan expelled Osama and even offered him gift-wrapped to Clinton? The old Taliban was more interested in retaining power than attacking America. Where did the 9/11 attacks come from then? First, it came from our oil rich "buddies" in the Persian Gulf - suicidal fanatics and rich financiers in Saudia Arabia, Yemen, etc. Second, it came from within. The 9/11 hijackers were granted entry into the US months prior to the attack, and learned to fly, evade authorities, and infiltrate airport security. You can't really get that training in the remote terrorist camps that Clinton bombed. Maybe at best the 9/11 terrorists learned basic combat tactics, explosives, and weapons training in Afghanistan - skills that were not pivotal in accomplishing the 9/11 attacks. But the panic and mania immediately following 9/11 allowed NATO to justify an Afghanistan invasion and Taliban coup to the UN, and the rest is history. So just because the war is sanctioned by the UN and 43 nations have contributed to the effort doesn't make it a righteous or necessary war (see Kosovo conflict).

And then Obama claimed that we can't allow the "same people" who perpetrated 9/11 to regain a foothold in Afghanistan to launch new attacks against us. The same people are not in Afghanistan now! Our initial special forces operations in Afghanistan in 2001 decimated much of Al Qaeda (some estimate up to 85%), and improved international surveillance has greatly reduced Al Qaeda's ability to travel, communicate, and obtain resources. By our Nat. Sec. Advisor's own admission, there are fewer than 100 "real Al Qaeda" inside Afghanistan (meaning Arabs directly connected to Osama's network and acting as his agents). Mullah Omar's Taliban no longer exists, and he is probably not even in country (same with Osama, who is quite ill by some accounts and only serves as a symbolic figure for terrorism). The "new Taliban" (or so we call them) are groups of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, or other dissident minority groups who are conducting an insurgency against foreign occupation and the Karzai regime, which is widely and accurately viewed as illegitimate and corrupt. Taliban means "students", as in those who have attended fundamentalist madrasas and subscribe to that form of Islamic doctrine. Most of the current "Taliban" have not even attended such schools (and are illiterate in fact), and they are definitely not unified and cohesive. Just as we lumped all communists together during the Cold War to our peril, we can't label everyone who is not friendly to the NATO presence as Taliban. At least Obama offered the olive branch to any Afghans willing to lay down their arms, but I am not sure how that offer will be received by the insurgents and Karzai.

Pakistan is a different and more delicate situation, so I will limit this discussion to Afghanistan. Clearly those nations' fates are intertwined, but does anyone really think that the Pakistani Taliban would be so belligerent today if we were not across the border in Afghanistan and killing Pakistanis with our drones (thereby undermining the Pakistani government that is supposedly critical to winning the War on Terror)? Whereas Al Qaeda ostensibly fight us because of who we are, the Taliban fight us because we are there. They have little interest in a global caliphate or the destruction of the West. They may not complain if those things happen, but they are not dedicated to achieving those goals. They fight because a foreign force is occupying their country (and a force with a history of imperialism, hostility, or at least disrespect to the Muslim world). So if we boost our military presence there, shouldn't we expect the insurgents to do the same? And let's remember that Bush/Obama already sent 21,000 new troops earlier this year to launch new offensives, and since then violence has only gotten worse and the Taliban have made shocking gains (they now "control" or roam freely in 15-25% of the country).

What will 30,000 more troops do for a rugged nation that is bigger than Iraq (both acreage and population, and a more diffuse rural population at that)? South Vietnam was a much smaller state, and the US had nearly 1M troops there, as well as 0.5-1M better trained and better equipped South Vietnamese forces. McChrystal's people want to copy as many successful Iraq techniques as possible, but the two wars are not interchangeable. As part of the "clear, hold, build" strategy, US forces will embed themselves with the local population to better protect them from insurgents. But many villages (especially in the volatile Helmand Province and Pashtun areas) do not want more Marines in their lives. They may not love the Taliban, but that doesn't mean they'll welcome us with open arms and offer aid (especially when collaboration with foreigners may provoke Taliban reprisals). It's not like the Iraqi Sunnis who were sometimes happy to have a US presence to prevent Shia takeover.

The hope is that we can train enough Afghan security personnel to assume ISAF's duties, so we can start our "victory withdrawal". Obama's plan is to train 400,000 more Afghans in the near future, which is a pipe dream. We probably couldn't even train 400,000 new American cops in a year. And as we've seen in Iraq, rapid recruitment of armed forces leaves us vulnerable to infiltration. Another problem is most Afghans don't trust the security forces, who often shake people down like thugs and are not trustworthy (or even participatory) in difficult combat situations. Plus it is quite challenging to develop a unified national army and police there, built from the remnants of the brutal Northern Alliance and local warlords. We have very little expertise in nation-building and peacekeeping in tribal/communal societies (see our great record in the Balkans and Africa). Afghanistan's forces are comprised of a dozen distinct ethnic groups, each of which is chiefly concerned with protecting its own population and probably won't risk themselves for anyone else (or may even be rivals with each other).

Obama is a young president and I'm sure a little awed or intimidated by the dashing senior brass at the Pentagon. He is not a pushover, but I think he is also very conflict and risk averse. He doesn't want the wars to overwhelm his other foreign and domestic policy initiatives. Generals always say they need more men/resources, and always believe that victory is not only possible, but assured, if they get what they need and we get out of their way. Heck, what manager doesn't ask for those things at work? In other words, the Pentagon's advice will always be biased, even if chickenhawks like Feith and Wolfowitz aren't directing traffic anymore. Our military leadership loves America and wants to keep us safe, but they are also arrogant and career-minded. Insurance companies resist health reform, so it should be expected that our generals resist withdrawal plans. Some hypothesize that McChrystal's force request was deliberately leaked early to the press to make it even harder for Obama to reject it. If Obama spurns the generals' request and Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, things will be very bad for him and his party. But the generals aren't car salesmen, and Obama and the American people shouldn't be shmoozed or pressured into buying an extended warranty and DVD entertainment system that we don't need.

I know we can't just pack up and abandon Afghanistan tomorrow, but after 8 years of spinning our wheels (at best), we really need to act with caution. If our objective is to stabilize and modernize Afghan society (the humanitarian mission that our NATO allies are more concerned with), as well as containing or hunting down those committed to international terrorism (the military mission that the US is more concerned with), then our actions should not destabilize the region or create new terrorists. I know I was pessimistic about the Iraq Surge and my fears did not really materialize, but most experts agree that Afghanistan is a much more difficult challenge. What is wrong with Biden's strategy of de-escalation? He believes that a surge would be counter-productive and we should actually reduce our footprint, shifting to surgical strikes against Al Qaeda and obvious Taliban targets. If we can't trust Karzai and we don't have the troops to really execute the Counterinsurgency Manual (and we don't), then what is the point of taking the McChrystal/Petraeus approach that will probably require a decade of more commitment to Afghanistan? Just because we're too ashamed of possible defeat?

To conclude, I was hoping Obama would declare a plan something like this (which also has a chance for success):

"My fellow Americans, fighting is not the only way, nor the preferred way, to defeat Al Qaeda and international terrorism. With UN backing, we invaded Afghanistan to bring to justice the perpetrators of 9/11 and those who protect them. While that objective still remains partially unresolved, we have gravely wounded Al Qaeda since then, and their ability to threaten our homeland, or even wire money to each other, is much reduced. For that, we all owe thanks to the Bush administration, our allies, and those in the armed forces and intelligence. It is true that Osama's inner circle roams fairly freely in the border region with Pakistan, and I am not happy about that. I pledge to constructively and respectfully work with the Pakistani government to address this problem. But as long as we maintain diligent surveillance, take good opportunities for surgical strikes with minimal civilian casualties, and support friendly military, economic, and democratic development in the region, I am confident that Bin Laden and his network pose minimal danger to us.

It is true that Taliban-like insurgents in Afghanistan threaten our allies in the Karzai government and our interests in the region. But unless we have a clear, quantifiable, plausible strategy and milestones for assessing and containing that threat, then it is not worth more American lives and resources to police a nation the size of Texas and as rugged as Alaska. Our armed forces are the toughest in the world, but they are stretched thin and not being used efficiently. By gradually and rationally drawing down US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan during my presidency, our men and women in uniform will be able to spend more time with their loved ones, receive improved training back home, and focus on small-scale counter-terrorism rather than state-scale counter-insurgency, which are two distinct missions. Withdrawing from a fight can also increase our security, because it will permit us to recuperate and be ready when the next serious fight emerges. We will still maintain a lean presence in Afghanistan to assist in the training of Afghan security forces, execute counter-terrorism operations, and aid the Karzai government to improve transparency, prosperity, the rule of law, and basic services to the Afghan people.

America is a great nation, but we have our limits and must respect the other peoples who share the planet with us. We cannot and probably should not intervene every time there is civil strife, and we should be aware that our extended military presence overseas may cause resentment and play into the hateful rhetoric of our enemies. Sometimes we must be humble and let other nations take the lead in attending to their affairs. Yes there will be delays and failures, but America did not become a global power overnight either. Let me be clear that we are not retreating like cowards or throwing our friends in the Middle East to the wolves. America will always be there when we are called upon and there is critical need, to friend and foe alike. While we may not be surging troops to Afghanistan, we will make a diplomatic and development surge. Under military protection and rigorous standards of accountability, we will greatly increase our aid projects. We will listen to our allies, deliver what they need, and offer our input while respecting their wishes. But our assistance is not unconditional and open-ended, and I will ensure that every taxpayer dollar spent on Afghanistan is an investment in real progress for the future, or it won't leave our shores. We can also defeat terror and extremism by being good global citizens and peacefully improving life in needy countries, so that the conditions which spawn hatred and violence never materialize. Thank you and good night."

http://www.kqed.org/epArchive/R912020900
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_fact_check_obama_afghanistan
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/30493567/the_generals_revolt
http://worldaffairs-manwnoname.blogspot.com/2009/08/problems-with-our-afghanistan-approach.html
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=120346497

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Newsweek's "How we could have won in Vietnam"


http://www.newsweek.com/id/221632

To Newsweek,

In response to your Nov. 16 cover story about how we could have won in Vietnam, your writers failed to mention that (a) the fact that we lost in Vietnam did not greatly imperil America as the hawks predicted, and (b) we could have recognized an independent Vietnam in 1945, and worked diplomatically to sway them from communism, thereby averting the deaths of over two million people.

a) After the US withdrew and South Vietnam fell, a pan-communist Asian axis never materialized to threaten Western interests in the region. In fact, those nations were at times hostile to each other. China briefly invaded Vietnam in response to their toppling of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea - all three being communist nations at the time. Since the 1990s, the US and Vietnam have been cordial trading partners, though of course political differences persist. But there was no "domino effect" or hateful Vietnamese fanatics plotting revenge against America, which is often speculatively associated with radical Islam today. Defeat is never palatable, but it's not the end of the world either, even in Afghanistan.

b) Abraham Lincoln said, "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?" A war with Vietnamese communists was not inevitable. The OSS helped Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh (precursors to the Viet Cong) fight an insurgency against the occupying Japanese during WWII, with the hopes of earning independence later. As a vision for the postwar world, the US and UK signed the "Atlantic Charter" proclaiming that all peoples have the right to self-determination, and Ho called Truman on it. But after the war, Washington ignored Vietnam as France attempted to reclaim its former colonies. If we upheld our principles of freedom and liberty, instead of succumbing to Cold War fears and bygone colonialism, we could have made an independent Vietnam our ally. Ho lived in the West and was inspired by the American Revolution, but the US decided to make him an enemy.

Friday, October 2, 2009

The FUBAR Afghan election


http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec09/afghanistan_10-01.html
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23113#

These links tell a scary story of how the recent Afghan presidential election was, instead of a victory for democracy against the Taliban menace, actually a major setback undermining that nation and the West's hopes for its improvement. It seems that once the Obama administration took power and Richard Holbrooke was appointed as special envoy, corrupt and paranoid President Karzai was convinced that America sought to replace him. So he plotted for months to stack the upcoming election in his favor. The UN assistance mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), desperate for some milestones of success amidst major security deterioration and stalled development under their watch, craved a "successful election". In order to demonstrate political progress, they turned over the reins to the Afghan government, instead of running and monitoring the process directly, as they did during the last election in 2004. So that is basically a recipe for disaster. And as in America, unfortunately the preparations for election caused governmental tunnel-vision and forced all other pressing Afghan issues to the back burner (education, infrastructure, justice, armed forces training, counter-narcotics, etc.). Security was concentrated on the polling stations instead of hunting Taliban, and it showed with several brazen Taliban attacks and bombings in "secure" urban areas like downtown Kabul. NATO deaths in the summer months leading up to the election were the highest in the war's 8-year history.

As one would expect, Karzai stacked the "independent election commission" with members partial to him, including foreigners to feign impartiality. All the warning signs of major fraud were obvious prior to the election. An American diplomat and deputy special rep to the UN Afghan mission, Peter Galbraith (son of the economist John Galbraith) raised these concerns to UNAMA, and was summarily ignored by chief Kai Eide. Galbraith's investigations had shown that the Afghan election commission set up many voting stations in Taliban-controlled regions where less than 10% of the populace was expected to turn out (due to poor security and threats to their lives). Those stations were located in areas too remote or dangerous for monitoring, and probably only existed on paper. Yet after the election, thousands of pro-Karzai votes came streaming in from those locations. Karzai eventually and improbably netted 54% of the overall vote, and his leading challenger, Abdullah Abdullah has challenged the legitimacy.

Galbraith's office had collected evidence of this, and he feels that his boss deliberately suppressed it. Their professional relationship deteriorated to the point where Eide complained to Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and had Galbraith removed. Ban chose appearances over the truth. The UN and the West were so desperate to pronounce the election a success as a propaganda blow to the Taliban that they covered up fraud. But as presidential challenger Abdullah said, the Taliban are obviously the biggest threat to Afghanistan's future, but an illegitimate, corrupt government is second. The UN doesn't seem to care. Somehow Karzai has convinced them to back him, maybe through bribery. Of course the UN's official excuse is that it has no "right" to interfere in the elections of a sovereign state, and we should be patient and let the Afghans sort it out. They do admit that fraud took place, but do not concede that the fraud was preventable, and overwhelmingly in Karzai's favor. The Obama administration and Holbrooke have been fairly quiet on the issue as well, even moreso than the disputed Iranian elections and Honduras coup d'etat.

If America, NATO, and the UN came to Afghanistan to help the people, show them good governance, and bring them into the 21st Century, then how can we tolerate this result? We toppled the "illegitimate" regime of the Taliban in 2001, but now we sit on the sidelines while a corrupt, inept political parasite (of course appointed by the Bushies) hijacks a nation that is vital to our security interests in the region. The only worse result would be if Osama won the election, legitimately (and by now I'm sure he is more popular among Afghans than Karzai). No wonder no one trusts or respects us and the Smurfs. We screw up Yugoslavia, Congo, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and pretty much every other warzone we go.

Thursday, September 17, 2009

National security news


1) Obama scrapping Bush's Eastern Europe missile defense shield.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090917/ap_on_re_eu/eu_eastern_europe_missile_defense

Way to go, Big O. Now hopefully Russia will reciprocate and increase cooperation on anti-terrorism, curbing weapons proliferation, energy, and dealing with states that are not so friendly with us. If our 2 nations can show a united front against Iran's nuclear activities, then maybe there will be enough leverage to get them to change course. Hopefully this will reduce tensions in the former Soviet nations. Well not everyone is happy. The anti-Russian nationalists in Czech and Poland are miffed, but oh well. Go find some oil in your country and then we'll talk.

2) Is the assumption that a pullout in Afghanistan would create/resume a "terrorist safe haven" for Al Qaeda to plot new, deadlier attacks against the West even valid?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html

After all, most of the preparations for 9/11 took place semi-autonomously in Europe and the US, not in some cave in Afghanistan. Currently, the 2001-era Qaeda leadership (what's left of it) is contained in Pakistan and mostly serving a propaganda/ideological inspiration function, not actually plotting or capable of harming against us again. In this modern electronic age, a physical base is not as crucial to international terrorists. So even if we invest the huge resources needed to stabilize Afghanistan, incur the political/moral costs of increased bloodshed and propping up a corrupt government, and are lucky/smart enough to pull it off halfway decently, how much will that even increase our security vs. Qaeda-symathetic cells that are already in the West? Plus, it's not like a "stable" Afghanistan still won't have terrorists lurking. Terrorists exist in highly secure nations like the US and UK as we speak.

And what about new havens in Somalia, tribal belt Pakistan, Iraq, Algeria, and such? If the hawks say havens are so crucial, why just send troops to Afghanistan? Don't we need to clear out those other places too? "Better fight them over there than at home." Or maybe while we're exhausting ourselves trying to fight an elusive enemy (or the wrong enemy, such as the Taelban or Ba'athists) overseas, while the terrorists who are the real threats to attack the US are still out there. Just imagine if we invested half the war resources of Iraq/Afghanistan to actual homeland DEFENSE, intel, and surgical counter-terrorism, maybe we wouldn't need the color threat level or "harsh interrogations" anymore.
Who's Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?
By Paul R. Pillar
Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Rationales for maintaining the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan are varied and complex, but they all center on one key tenet: that Afghanistan must not be allowed to again become a haven for terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda. Debate about Afghanistan has raised reasons to question that tenet, one of which is that the top al-Qaeda leadership is not even in Afghanistan, having decamped to Pakistan years ago. Another is that terrorists intent on establishing a haven can choose among several unstable countries besides Afghanistan, and U.S. forces cannot secure them all.

The debate has largely overlooked a more basic question: How important to terrorist groups is any physical haven? More to the point: How much does a haven affect the danger of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, especially the U.S. homeland? The answer to the second question is: not nearly as much as unstated assumptions underlying the current debate seem to suppose. When a group has a haven, it will use it for such purposes as basic training of recruits. But the operations most important to future terrorist attacks do not need such a home, and few recruits are required for even very deadly terrorism. Consider: The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.

In the past couple of decades, international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens.

By utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists' organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters. A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists, but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all. Al-Qaeda's role in that threat is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless.

These trends have been familiar to counterterrorist cognoscenti for years but have gone mostly unmentioned in discussion of Afghanistan. This is probably because the intervention there in late 2001 was unquestionably a response to Sept. 11 -- the "good war," in contrast with the misguided expedition to Iraq, where the only connection to the 2001 attacks was in the Bush administration's contorted selling of that invasion. The U.S. entry into the Afghan civil war succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power and rousting its al-Qaeda allies, and the intervention would have occurred regardless of whether the occupant of the White House was named Bush or Gore.

The issue today does not concern what was worth disrupting eight years ago. And it is not whether a haven in Afghanistan would be of any use to a terrorist group -- it would.

Instead, the issue is whether preventing such a haven would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.

Among the many parallels being offered between Afghanistan and the Vietnam War, one of the most disturbing concerns inadequate examination of core assumptions. The Johnson administration was just as meticulous as the Obama administration is being in examining counterinsurgent strategies and the forces required to execute them. But most American discourse about Vietnam in the early and mid-1960s took for granted the key -- and flawed -- assumptions underlying the whole effort: that a loss of Vietnam would mean that other Asian countries would fall like dominoes to communism, and that a retreat from the commitment to Vietnam would gravely harm U.S. credibility.

The Obama administration and other participants in the debate about expanding the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan can still avoid comparable error. But this would require not merely invoking Sept. 11 and taking for granted that a haven in Afghanistan would mean the difference between repeating and not repeating that horror. It would instead mean presenting a convincing case about how such a haven would significantly increase the terrorist danger to the United States. That case has not yet been made.

The writer was deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the CIA from 1997 to 1999. He is director of graduate studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program.

Sunday, August 2, 2009

Problems with our Afghanistan approach


http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

I found these 3 quotes from the author to be most telling:

-Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building.
-Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble.
-The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is... not a plan; it is a description of what we have not got.

From Rory Stewart, Kennedy School of Government, Afghanistan expert. NATO may find it a lot harder to achieve Iraq-level "success" in Afghanistan (how disheartening is that?). A troop surge may buy time for government to fill the Taleban void, reconcile the hostile groups, and improve the rule of law/human services, except that this is the Afghan government we're talking about - completely incapable of doing any of that. It's not necessarily their fault, since Afghanistan is one of the 10 poorest nations on Earth, very remote/harsh, with a very under-educated populace, and recovering from decades of war and social turmoil. In addition, there are no marginalized, deal-making Sunnis to "awaken" to our side, and Afghanistan is geographically larger than Iraq yet we've devoted 38% fewer troops: 146,000 for Iraq vs. 90,000 for Afghanistan (that is including the less motivated, experienced, risk-taking non-US forces, as well as the upper estimate of Obama's 2009 surge request). But of course military models recommend a force of at least 500,000 to properly stabilize a nation like Afghanistan. That is impossible, and so is this: the Pentagon seeks to train and deploy a combined Afghan security force of approx. 450,000 men to take over as we draw down (assuming Surge part 2 succeeds). But supporting such a force would require 500% of Afghanistan's current budget (narco-commerce not included).

This is what Obama recently said of the Afghanistan challenge:

[The Afghan gov't] is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaida terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject.

Well that leaves very little room for error, doesn't it? Isn't this the same problem Bush/Blair had justifying/selling the Iraq quagmire? I guess Democrats can do fear-mongering too, like LBJ in Vietnam. Just as it was ludicrous to fear that Saddam would equip terrorists with WMD to strike America, it's unrealistic to think that Western inaction will lead to Taleban/Qaeda takeover of 2 failed states and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. And it's not a foregone conclusion that those 2 groups will even be able to cooperate in the future, as they have poor track records and clearly different objectives.

And Stewart continues: It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion. It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad ... general ... and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate.

Sounds like a blast from the past. New administration but same ignorance, hubris, and vague/misplaced goals. Yes it's true that the stakes are great and Afghanistan is a critical foreign policy priority, but framing the discussion in this manner is not helpful or responsible. In other words, we can't approach Afghanistan as a test of wills or a holy war. That is how our opponents think (or so some say), and that is what they want from us. Yet strangely everyone and their mother are on board for Obama's plan (the UN, aid groups, NATO, our Muslim allies, and even Afghans). It's just because they hate/fear the oppressive Taleban so much, and are terribly war-weary and desperate. We all hope that an increase in troops will magically fix Afghanistan, but we have to remember history and consider the objective data.

Stewart suggests a sleeker approach with less of a Western footprint on Afghanistan. Nation-building must be an Afghan-driven process, and nothing that we implement will work well or last. Our special forces operations to cripple Qaeda have been effective since 2001, so let's continue that instead of clogging the battlefield and Afghan communities with our regular troops that weren't built or trained for this delicate, difficult purpose. Careful air strikes and 20,000 special forces are enough for surgical missions that will place fewer civilians at risk. If we truly want to increase the rule of law, government functionality, and development over there, then we should stop pretending and actually seriously fund/equip those projects to the level that is required. So we need more boots on the ground for sure, just not boots toting rifles.