Problems with our Afghanistan approach

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

I found these 3 quotes from the author to be most telling:

-Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building.
-Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble.
-The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is... not a plan; it is a description of what we have not got.

From Rory Stewart, Kennedy School of Government, Afghanistan expert. NATO may find it a lot harder to achieve Iraq-level "success" in Afghanistan (how disheartening is that?). A troop surge may buy time for government to fill the Taleban void, reconcile the hostile groups, and improve the rule of law/human services, except that this is the Afghan government we're talking about - completely incapable of doing any of that. It's not necessarily their fault, since Afghanistan is one of the 10 poorest nations on Earth, very remote/harsh, with a very under-educated populace, and recovering from decades of war and social turmoil. In addition, there are no marginalized, deal-making Sunnis to "awaken" to our side, and Afghanistan is geographically larger than Iraq yet we've devoted 38% fewer troops: 146,000 for Iraq vs. 90,000 for Afghanistan (that is including the less motivated, experienced, risk-taking non-US forces, as well as the upper estimate of Obama's 2009 surge request). But of course military models recommend a force of at least 500,000 to properly stabilize a nation like Afghanistan. That is impossible, and so is this: the Pentagon seeks to train and deploy a combined Afghan security force of approx. 450,000 men to take over as we draw down (assuming Surge part 2 succeeds). But supporting such a force would require 500% of Afghanistan's current budget (narco-commerce not included).

This is what Obama recently said of the Afghanistan challenge:

[The Afghan gov't] is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaida terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject.

Well that leaves very little room for error, doesn't it? Isn't this the same problem Bush/Blair had justifying/selling the Iraq quagmire? I guess Democrats can do fear-mongering too, like LBJ in Vietnam. Just as it was ludicrous to fear that Saddam would equip terrorists with WMD to strike America, it's unrealistic to think that Western inaction will lead to Taleban/Qaeda takeover of 2 failed states and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. And it's not a foregone conclusion that those 2 groups will even be able to cooperate in the future, as they have poor track records and clearly different objectives.

And Stewart continues: It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion. It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad ... general ... and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate.

Sounds like a blast from the past. New administration but same ignorance, hubris, and vague/misplaced goals. Yes it's true that the stakes are great and Afghanistan is a critical foreign policy priority, but framing the discussion in this manner is not helpful or responsible. In other words, we can't approach Afghanistan as a test of wills or a holy war. That is how our opponents think (or so some say), and that is what they want from us. Yet strangely everyone and their mother are on board for Obama's plan (the UN, aid groups, NATO, our Muslim allies, and even Afghans). It's just because they hate/fear the oppressive Taleban so much, and are terribly war-weary and desperate. We all hope that an increase in troops will magically fix Afghanistan, but we have to remember history and consider the objective data.

Stewart suggests a sleeker approach with less of a Western footprint on Afghanistan. Nation-building must be an Afghan-driven process, and nothing that we implement will work well or last. Our special forces operations to cripple Qaeda have been effective since 2001, so let's continue that instead of clogging the battlefield and Afghan communities with our regular troops that weren't built or trained for this delicate, difficult purpose. Careful air strikes and 20,000 special forces are enough for surgical missions that will place fewer civilians at risk. If we truly want to increase the rule of law, government functionality, and development over there, then we should stop pretending and actually seriously fund/equip those projects to the level that is required. So we need more boots on the ground for sure, just not boots toting rifles.