After worldwide moral cowardice during the Rwanda genocide,
the UN adopted the "responsibility to protect" (RTP) doctrine, which
states that global powers have the duty to "take action" when there is
evidence of genocide. Two concerns: it leaves it up to the individual
nations as to what actions are warranted, and the definition of genocide
is pretty hazy. So it's a non-binding statute to say the least.
RTP was used to justify NATO bombing the Serbs over Bosnia,
NATO bombing Saddam for gassing the Kurds, and most recently NATO
bombing Qaddafi's military (for the record, Qaddafi wasn't really engaging
in genocide, unless you consider those rebelling against him as a
threatened minority). Of course other genocides have taken place since
Rwanda where no one took any action beyond speeches. This inconsistency
undermines the credibility of some global powers vis-a-vis RTP.
Last week the Syrian opposition claimed that Assad used
chemical weapons on civilians/rebels in a Damascus suburb, and hundreds
were sickened and killed. There is a lot of
evidence
to support that claim. This is the 2nd widely documented chem. attack
by Assad in the last 3 months. Earlier in the civil war, Obama
threatened that Assad deploying WMDs would cross a "red line" where the
US would be forced to act. We did nothing after the first attack, but
after this recent attack we have deployed more warships to the area (for
possible missile strikes). However, there are several reasons why
military intervention (even under the RTP) would be
problematic for the specific case of Syria.
Bosnia is the only case on record where military intervention
(with no boots on the ground amazingly) actually stopped war crimes. And
the NATO bombing stopped it cold; i.e. Serbia rushed to the bargaining
table the next day. But the differences with Syria are like night and
day, so we can't expect to be that lucky again:
- Assad is locked in an existential internal struggle and
major blood feud, while Milosevic was supporting Bosnian Serbs in a
proxy war with very little strategic value or reasons to escalate
- There were clear, centralized chains of command in the Balkans, vs. quasi-chaos in Syria
-
Bosnia was pretty much the nastiest war in the EU's backyard during a
very peaceful period of world history (more attention, outrage, and
support for intervention), while Syria is a blip (albeit a very tragic,
bloody one) in the protracted War on Terror, failed Arab Spring, and
general Mideast unrest that deters foreign powers from decisive action
- Russia and China will really risk a lot to go to bat for
Syria, while most of Serbia's "allies" (including Russia) were not that
close and easily persuaded to drop support
Then what about Libya? Over 100,000 Syrians have died so far; some in
"legitimate" civil strife and others unlawfully. Qaddafi didn't come
anywhere close to that (Libya as a nation is only 6M concentrated in a
few major cities vs. Syria's 22M). But we helped the rebels topple his
ass. Well, the effort was mostly led by the French (who sound more
aggressive on Syria as well), so the US could "lead from behind" and not
take flak for the consequences. Also we intervened when the Arab Spring
momentum was strong and we appeared to be turning a new page in the
region. In other words, lots of upside with little cost. Over a year
later, we now know there were some major costs: they can't form a
coalition gov't, they can't disarm their militias, they can't protect
our ambassador, and arms used to oust Qaddafi (some given by the West)
are getting funneled to Syria, Yemen, and other hot spots. So even a "no
brainer" intervention has its downside.
This puts Obama in a real bad spot, obviously. If we keep
talking about war crimes and not doing anything about it, then our
credibility sinks even lower than its current abysmal level in the
region. Also if we don't respond, innocents will continue to die and the
instability/refugee crisis will threaten fragile neighboring nations.
If we bomb Assad, then it's possible Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies
will attack our forces in the Gulf (and no guarantee it will stop the
atrocities). Plus it will further worsen our strategic relations with
China and Russia. If we support the rebels (and they win), then Alawites
will be persecuted/slaughtered and another Egypt might happen, except
this time Al Nusra (overt Al Qaeda affiliates) could lead instead of the
"tame" Muslim Brotherhood.
There's no way we put boots on the ground after Obama has campaigned
and worked hard for years to pull out of our recent 2 Mideast wars. I
believe no-win situations are in fact very rare if parties really give
full effort to come to a solution, but Syria could actually be a legit
one.
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Oh, forgot to mention... punitive air strikes can really go both
ways, though clearly we don't have a big data sampling to study. Bombing
worked well in the Bosnia War, but then I guess Milosevic learned and
he was a lot less cooperative during the
Kosovo War.
Whereas we only bombed for a few days in Bosnia, Kosovo required over
70 DAYS of air strikes before the Serbs came to the bargaining table.
Good thing too as NATO was running out of military targets, and decided
to punish all the people of Serbia by expanding their target list to
include irrelevant, peaceful infrastructure like the power grid and
chemical plants. Also
some accounts
suggest that there really wasn't much evidence of atrocities against
Kosovar Albanians, and NATO just wanted to teach Slobo a lesson at the
time. After the first wave of cruise missiles, sadly the killing of
Albanians increased out of retaliation. That's the problem with "long
distance war", you have even less influence than conventional chaotic
war. And it doesn't help our image, especially considering anger over our cowardly reliance on sometime illegal drone attacks. So even if we effectively and carefully target Assad's weapons (and
I'm sure his WMD are carefully protected/hidden), we can't stop his
ground forces from slaughtering more dissidents. UN boots on the ground
won't guarantee civilian safety either. A
recent report
slammed the post-bombing UN-NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo for
failing to protect local ethnic Serbs from revenge attacks by Albanians,
and not investigating claims that thousands went "missing." The
Alawites know what is coming if their side loses.
We are backing them and Assad into a corner. What is he going
to do, capitulate? Slobo was still the popular leader of Serbia,
possibly wanted for war crimes, and had something to lose if he didn't
bargain to save his neck. Assad knows there is no scenario where he
doesn't go to the dock or the morgue, so of course he is not going to
respond they way we would like (especially after seeing what happened to
other dictators who thought they would be safe by playing ball with
America, like Qaddafi). I guess that is why diplomacy is so precious
before the streets are full of blood and everyone gets irrational; now
we've missed our chance to intervene effectively and are left with only
bad options.
But we just can't sit idly by either, refusing to be vigilant after a
regime has used WMD on civilians (and likely shot at UN inspectors
trying to investigate that). If we stick to our guns, we have to go
all-in then. Toppling Assad is the easy part, but we have to make sure
to not let Syria become another Egypt, Iraq, or Kosovo. And we have to
make sure we can afford to intervene, both financially and politically.
Or we hold off and try to bribe Russia/China into permitting a UN
mandate, then go in as a coalition and try our best to not F it up
again.