Follow-up discussion to Cold War 2.0 post

In reading what you wrote I agree to a certain extent but you lost me in the conclusions that you draw:

(1) NATO is a military organization... but it is a *defense* organization; insofar as one might be talking about military matters or (implicitly?) reserving the right to use force, it is not offensive in the case of NATO.

(2) Expelling the baltic nations that joined NATO would likely only lead to a liability with no recourse (i.e. the need to defend nations that have been, at that point, willfully excluded); isn't the catch-22 with respect to military force (e.g. missile defense that could be withdrawn) that you would you need it when it's no longer there (i.e. not have a motivation to remove it once you've put it in place)?

(3) Withdrawal would remove the semblance of a pretense... but only where the facts of the same are clear; it is openly speculated that, within Russia, what is reported is not consistent with what is reported in America... further, if Russia is acting out of fear then they would just be that much more likely to start WWIII given the opportunity - so how to signal the absence of hostile intent (independent of never attacking Afghanistan & Iraq in the first place) while not rewarding the Russians for flouting international norms under the guise of keeping an unaccountable U.S. in check?

(4) Russia should withdraw from Crimea... though Vladamir Putin has publicly declared, on multiple occasions, that he will not do so (and that economic sanctions can damage the country for the next couple of years without it affecting his opinion).

(5) We cannot "just let Ukraine duke it out and let the chips fall as (uh, where) they may"... Much like the people in those Baltic states that joined NATO post-2000 it is not the fault of the people but rather their leaders (and the fears/uncertainties/dependencies of those leaders) insofar as there is some problem today - statecraft is slow, steady work (kinda like email) but that is all the more reason to not putz up what we already have in the first place (a sentiment I imagine you agree with)...

PS: There are probably a handful of people out there with the game theory experience to see right through the situation to a simple solution; all I know is that compromise requires give and take (as you hinted at) and working together towards a common goal - maybe Obama's efforts at nuclear deterrence (i.e. decommissioning of nuclear weapons) should get some attention before he leaves office.

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Thx for your reply and hope you're well.

1. I agree with you about NATO's mission, but from the Russian perspective it doesn't matter - they are hostile and potentially offensive if they are observed to keep adding Eastern member states and massing troops near Russia. It is provocative.
2. You can't really win a cold war. Detente and the USSR collapse was exceptionally fortunate for the US and the world, and I'm not sure if we can expect it again. So the alternative is to reduce tension and live with a balance. That means a demilitarized buffer zone between NATO and Russia, to reduce fear on both sides. You presume that Russia intends to invade the Baltics. We don't know that for sure, and they may only be posturing to invade now because they see NATO massing and want to be able to strike first. You see how defense/precaution on both sides can lead to aggression? That is what we need to avoid.
1. I did say that NATO leaving the Baltics is based on a guarantee that they would help if Russia invades. So it is de facto like they are still in NATO (an attack on any member is an attack on all), but without the provocative troops presence that upsets Russia.
3. I think you signal lack of hostile intent and avoid rewarding Russia for bad behavior by: 
1. NATO pulling out of the Baltics, refusing to add any new members that are Russian neighbors, and ceasing military exercises on Russia's flank
2. But also requiring Russia to give back Crimea, stop its arms buildup in the arctic and on the Western border, and cease all military assistance to the Ukrainian rebels - only then will they lift the econ. sanctions
3. And let's remember - the goal is to avoid war, so there has to be some compromise. Sometime that means relaxing principles and "appeasing", as long as you believe it won't enable future worse behavior
4. Putin has to take a hard line with public statements, but I am not sure how critical Crimea is to his defense strategy (they obviously did just fine for decades without it). Again, if NATO pulled back, I think his fixation on Crimea would also naturally wane (esp. with the carrot of lifting sanctions on the table).
5. It's not like I want to abandon Ukraine, but what choice do we have? We can't allow Ukraine to be a proxy cold war and pretext for nuclear war. If either side meddles in Ukraine, it will necessitate a tit-for-tat by the other side, and then you get the escalation spiral. Maybe someone will blink like the CMC, but sadly we can't count on Putin to be as conscientious as Khruschev. And let's remember that the rebels are still at a disadvantage, and have little chance of taking over the country. Maybe the best thing is for Eastern Ukraine to secede if it stops the killing (like in Sudan)? Of course that is not ideal for the gov't in Kiev, but peace has a price.