Follow-up discussion to Cold War 2.0 post

In reading what you wrote I agree to a certain extent but you lost me in the conclusions that you draw:

(1) NATO is a military organization... but it is a *defense* organization; insofar as one might be talking about military matters or (implicitly?) reserving the right to use force, it is not offensive in the case of NATO.

(2) Expelling the baltic nations that joined NATO would likely only lead to a liability with no recourse (i.e. the need to defend nations that have been, at that point, willfully excluded); isn't the catch-22 with respect to military force (e.g. missile defense that could be withdrawn) that you would you need it when it's no longer there (i.e. not have a motivation to remove it once you've put it in place)?

(3) Withdrawal would remove the semblance of a pretense... but only where the facts of the same are clear; it is openly speculated that, within Russia, what is reported is not consistent with what is reported in America... further, if Russia is acting out of fear then they would just be that much more likely to start WWIII given the opportunity - so how to signal the absence of hostile intent (independent of never attacking Afghanistan & Iraq in the first place) while not rewarding the Russians for flouting international norms under the guise of keeping an unaccountable U.S. in check?

(4) Russia should withdraw from Crimea... though Vladamir Putin has publicly declared, on multiple occasions, that he will not do so (and that economic sanctions can damage the country for the next couple of years without it affecting his opinion).

(5) We cannot "just let Ukraine duke it out and let the chips fall as (uh, where) they may"... Much like the people in those Baltic states that joined NATO post-2000 it is not the fault of the people but rather their leaders (and the fears/uncertainties/dependencies of those leaders) insofar as there is some problem today - statecraft is slow, steady work (kinda like email) but that is all the more reason to not putz up what we already have in the first place (a sentiment I imagine you agree with)...

PS: There are probably a handful of people out there with the game theory experience to see right through the situation to a simple solution; all I know is that compromise requires give and take (as you hinted at) and working together towards a common goal - maybe Obama's efforts at nuclear deterrence (i.e. decommissioning of nuclear weapons) should get some attention before he leaves office.

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Thx for your reply and hope you're well.

1. I agree with you about NATO's mission, but from the Russian perspective it doesn't matter - they are hostile and potentially offensive if they are observed to keep adding Eastern member states and massing troops near Russia. It is provocative.
2. You can't really win a cold war. Detente and the USSR collapse was exceptionally fortunate for the US and the world, and I'm not sure if we can expect it again. So the alternative is to reduce tension and live with a balance. That means a demilitarized buffer zone between NATO and Russia, to reduce fear on both sides. You presume that Russia intends to invade the Baltics. We don't know that for sure, and they may only be posturing to invade now because they see NATO massing and want to be able to strike first. You see how defense/precaution on both sides can lead to aggression? That is what we need to avoid.
1. I did say that NATO leaving the Baltics is based on a guarantee that they would help if Russia invades. So it is de facto like they are still in NATO (an attack on any member is an attack on all), but without the provocative troops presence that upsets Russia.
3. I think you signal lack of hostile intent and avoid rewarding Russia for bad behavior by: 
1. NATO pulling out of the Baltics, refusing to add any new members that are Russian neighbors, and ceasing military exercises on Russia's flank
2. But also requiring Russia to give back Crimea, stop its arms buildup in the arctic and on the Western border, and cease all military assistance to the Ukrainian rebels - only then will they lift the econ. sanctions
3. And let's remember - the goal is to avoid war, so there has to be some compromise. Sometime that means relaxing principles and "appeasing", as long as you believe it won't enable future worse behavior
4. Putin has to take a hard line with public statements, but I am not sure how critical Crimea is to his defense strategy (they obviously did just fine for decades without it). Again, if NATO pulled back, I think his fixation on Crimea would also naturally wane (esp. with the carrot of lifting sanctions on the table).
5. It's not like I want to abandon Ukraine, but what choice do we have? We can't allow Ukraine to be a proxy cold war and pretext for nuclear war. If either side meddles in Ukraine, it will necessitate a tit-for-tat by the other side, and then you get the escalation spiral. Maybe someone will blink like the CMC, but sadly we can't count on Putin to be as conscientious as Khruschev. And let's remember that the rebels are still at a disadvantage, and have little chance of taking over the country. Maybe the best thing is for Eastern Ukraine to secede if it stops the killing (like in Sudan)? Of course that is not ideal for the gov't in Kiev, but peace has a price.

Cold War 2.0

http://www.hbo.com/vice/episodes/03/36-cold-war-2-0/video/ep-314-debrief.html?autoplay=true

Vice had a special about the Ukraine crisis, and how the US/NATO and Russia are inching closer to the brink (even though we might not realize it in light of the spotty media coverage).

We know that the Russian regime is corrupt and in some cases unlawful. Probably the world would be better off without Putin. But of course they see the US exactly the same, and we have committed war crimes since the fall of the USSR too. Domestic media paint things as good vs. evil in both nations. Maybe with the facts as the impartial judge, Russia has committed more transgressions than the West, but that doesn't really matter when missiles get launched.

So how did we get here?

• After the fall of the USSR, the Russian economy was in shambles, their pride was shaken, and recently freed Warsaw Pact republics were looking towards new partnerships in Europe for prosperity and security
• Russia's aging military was about all it had going for it when Putin took power (embarrassed by the Kursk sub accident, botched hostage rescues, and troubles fighting the Chechens), and his cabinet has been aggressively spending and modernizing since the US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Surging energy prices due to the War on Terror and rise of Asia helped Russia's defense budget
• Former Soviet territories Czech, Poland, and Hungary joined NATO in 1999, and with US encouragement, 9 more nations followed suit from 2004-2009 (incl. all the Baltics)
• And with the War on Terror bringing US/Coalition forces to several Central Asian republics and Afghanistan, Russia saw itself militarily encircled
• Traditionally, the US feels that it controls the Americas and Pacific, and Russia's sphere of influence is Central Asia, but now where does Eastern Europe stand?
• Russia's influence was challenged in the Balkan wars, where Serbia was an important ally
• While Bosnia was a UN-approved mission, the Kosovo campaign was mostly driven by NATO, due to the Russian UN veto
• NATO decided to defy Russia and bomb Serbia without UN approval, which was seen as disrespectful aggression and a possible portent of future incursions into previously "hands off" nations in the Russian sphere
• The Orange Revolution in Ukraine failed (mostly driven by their terrible economy), and they legitimately returned a pro-Moscow leader (Yanukovich) to power
• Yanukovich was working to scrap a previous deal to bring Ukraine into the EU, which upset much of pro-European western Ukraine
• He eventually stepped down amidst protests, but Russia saw this as a US-backed coup, the Ukrainian civil war broke out, and Russia illegally annexed Crimea
• Putin also declared that Russia should control lands where Russian is spoken, which includes eastern Ukraine (Donetsk region) and some of the Baltics
• I won't go into the Ukraine war details here because it's complex and I don't know much, but it's clear that both powers do not want Ukraine to fall to the other side
• But as a result, NATO has tripled its troops presence in the Baltics/Arctic, and there are even US troops on the ground in western Ukraine
• Russia has amassed forces on the Ukraine border to levels not seen since WWII (and also moved nukes to their far western territory Kalingrad, which is 300 miles from Berlin)
• The US has been working on installing missile defense batteries in Eastern Europe since the Bush years (currently stalled but Obama has revise the plan to start construction in Poland in 2018)
• Both sides are posturing/provoking the other with large military exercises and unusual presence of air/sea forces in previously neutral areas

Who knows what mistakes or calculated risks could result in a scary escalation? So how to we pull back from the brink?

• The problem with military buildups is that the other side can't be sure if they are defensive or not
• We in the West would probably find it ridiculous that Russians think that NATO wants to attack them, but can you really blame them?
• The US/EU sanctions on Russia due to their Ukraine actions is seen as economic warfare (even though the plunging Ruble is mostly due to oil than our sanctions)
• They saw how the US/UK ignored dissenting opinions, brutally invaded and occupied Iraq, and set up new bases all over the world like imperialists
• If the US wants to be the sole superpower, obviously they need to knock down Russia a notch or two (or cage them like we do with Iran)
• But Russia also wants to seize the opportunity of a militarily distracted/weakened US in order to increase its influence and security position - maybe back to the USSR days where they were feared by all
• NATO can't just sit idly by when Crimea falls and Russia is lying about its troops and weapons pouring into Donetsk, so they feel the need to send forces east to show they mean business and deter further Russian aggression
• Barring a risky nuclear ultimatum, both sides will not back down at present course (and will match actions tit-for-tat), so a different strategy is needed
• There are no "madmen" in this situation, and both sides are acting perfectly rationally - just like the Cuban Missile Crisis. But that is the scary part: when escalation to war is the rational move (not to mention what freak accidents or irrational moves could occur), we have to change the rules of the game before it's too late.
• A stalemate and huge buildup of forces on the border is not a sustainable solution either, because a bunch of anxious troops and one false move could make things quickly unravel. We have to demilitarize Eastern Europe, and hopefully permanently.
• Why did NATO accept the Baltics and other former Warsaw Pact nations into their club? Those armies are tiny - what did NATO have to gain defensively at the risk of provoking Russia? That land is very valuable from an offensive standpoint, which is why Russia took it so seriously.
• They should be free to join the EU for prosperity and non-military cooperation, but NATO is a military org with only one purpose - a hedge against Russian invasion of WESTERN Europe (kind of irrelevant since the UK and France have nukes)
• We can kindly "expel" those nations from NATO (compensate them economically), withdraw all forces (incl. any missile defense plans), and declare those nations an unaligned buffer zone - but sign a treaty with Russia that any incursions from either side will be met with force
• That way we remove pretense that Russia uses to justify its actions against a perceived NATO threat, and if Russia does try to muscle into Eastern Europe again, they must do so fully aware that they're ushering in WWIII
• Russia should reciprocate by withdrawing from Crimea
• We just have to let Ukraine duke it out and let the chips fall as they may; the losing power has to respect the rights of the victorious side in the name of world peace
• I'm not saying any of this is easy, and some people will get screwed, but it gives a better chance to avoid nuclear war than the status quo

Cheney and the GOP criticizing Obama over Crimea

http://news.yahoo.com/cheney-putin-obama-ukraine-171405306.html

I find it ironic (but typical) that Cheney and others in the GOP (except for the Paul family libertarians) would bash Obama for being "weak" in the face of Putin's aggression in Crimea. Politicians have short memories, but I seem to recall that Bush did jack squat against Russia's overt invasion of Georgia in 2008 (and in that war, >700 people died whereas in Crimea one guy got a concussion so far). Diplomacy, not threats or military buildup, eventually led to a Russian withdrawal and UN peacekeeping mission.

Obama said that the US would issue travel restrictions and asset freezes of Russian nationals tied to the Crimea situation (that is already more than Bush did in 2008). We are giving $1B in aid to Ukraine's bankrupt transition gov't. Obama is pulling out of a future G8 summit in Sochi and will likely cut some planned joint military activities. But that's about all he can do for now. If we can't pressure Assad to change course, what do you think we can do against a top energy producer and nuclear arsenal? It remains to be seen if the EU will implement these sanctions too in order to make them more effective, but of course they have more to lose being closer proximity and dependent on Russia for gas and trade.

Previously, I was against Bush's plans to build a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe (ostensibly to counter Iran, but we know who it was meant for). I thought it was provocative to Russia, ineffective, and a handout to Lockheed. Our defense budget is tighter now, but I am reconsidering whether the missile shield would be useful as a strategic deterrent (albeit a pricey one). Russia should abandon their plans to reclaim former Soviet republics, as the West is not going to stand for it as long as the peoples of Eastern Europe are choosing Western values over Putinism.

After the Georgia War:

The [2008 EU] Report claimed that Russian citizenship, conferred to the vast part of Abkhaz and Ossetians may not be considered legally binding under international law. As a result, the interests of these people may not be used as a reason for starting military actions, in defense of Russian citizens living abroad.