Reactions to the nuclear deal in Israel and Iran

http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/07/20/424702931/parrying-doubts-in-two-capitals-leaders-sell-the-iran-nuclear-deal
http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2015/07/17/423484372/on-cutting-off-an-interview-subject

As expected, Bibi blew a gasket over the deal and is going all-out with his verbal attacks to potentially sway the US Congress and public (Iran is basically the 4th Reich, etc.). He took his tired Chicken Little routine to NPR (also ABC and others), and forgot that it was an interview vs. a stump speech (2nd link). The host was worried about keeping time, so he had to cut off the PM according to the show schedule. Some pro-Israel Americans felt that was disrespectful to the leader of Israel (because of course that person is special, and commands even more respect than our own president).

However, and unexpected consequence occurred in Iran. If Bibi and Israel are staunchly against something, of course that encourages Persians to think that it's a good thing. There are some hardliners and critics of the deal in Iran, but now it makes it a lot harder for them to make credible arguments that happen to align with the views of Tel Aviv. Of course Bibi is naturally focused on the US audience rather than the Iranian reaction, but it's an interesting example of multiparty cause-and-effect in geopolitics.

Views in Israel are apparently mixed, and some in the security services do not agree that the deal is bad. Also they want their leaders to remember that the nuclear deal is not the only item at play here - their relationship with the US is valuable and is it worth it to strain it further? You can tell that Obama, Kerry, and some other gov't officials are visibly irritated with Israel's reaction compared to most of the rest of the world. Instead, why not partner more with the 5+1 to make sure Iran lives up to its commitments and the deal succeeds? But like the game theory Iran-Israel-US post, our priorities are not aligned, so it might not work out.

It's possible that the extra money in Iran's coffers will exacerbate the other problems that Israel has with Iran (supporting Hamas, Hizbullah, etc.). Maybe it's justified for the US to extend the olive branch and offer enhanced cooperation/support for antiterrorism, and/or temporarily look the other way if Israel gets a little tougher on Palestine and settlements. It's like bribing a kid with a toy for him to eat his vegetables. The veggies are good for him in the long term, but he doesn't see it that way, so you have to offer a side concession?

---

I listened to the interview and Bibi was ranting.  He had talking points that he wanted to get out and the interviewer attempted multiple times to interject with a next question before doing a "rude" cutoff.  If Bibi was talking with him instead of at him that would have been easy to notice.

---

If Bibi wanted to make an uninterrupted persuasive speech, then he could have paid for TV/radio commercial time, or gone to FNC. If he agrees to an interview on NPR, he should expect to be treated like an interviewee. Listening to it again, I actually didn't think he was ranting much and there were no moments of disrespect. Green let Bibi talk a lot in the 1st half of the segment, which was maybe his bad since it led to the need to cut Bibi off later. Bibi said thank you to Green at the end, he didn't protest. Some NPR callers were maybe a little sensitive.

The NPR ombudsman seemed to be OK with Green's conduct too:

Greene was respectful to Netanyahu, apologizing for interrupting. The last question was an important one—asking Netanyahu whether he could "at some point get behind this deal"—and Greene would likely have been criticized had he not asked it. The need to cut him off was regrettable, but with the interview already eating into local station time, it was necessary. Those are the perils of live radio and the constrictions of NPR's clock, which values local news.

Hollow criticism by the right of the Iran nuclear deal

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/iran-deal-obama-sees-validation-diplomatic-gamble/

And the FNC version: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/07/14/iran-nuclear-deal-much-worse-than-experts-predicted.html

As Obama said to the conservatives, "What is their alternative?" I'm sure some of them would publicly or privately call for war, or at least stronger sanctions (I'll get to why that won't work in a bit). Maybe others like Trump think that Obama's team are amateur negotiators compared to the Iranians, and only he could outsmart them to a better deal (he did ghost-write "The Art of the Deal" after all!).

The goal is not to turn Iran into a model nation and have them cease all their questionable/negative activities - that's not going to happen for decades (no matter what leverage or violence we apply). The goal and scope were always limited: to stop or ideally reverse Iran's progress towards bomb capability (i.e. right now they could possibly get a working bomb in 3 months if they go all-out; let's make some changes so that time frame gets a lot longer), and enable the int'l community to detect whether they are cheating. To address some criticisms:

• Why take our foot off the gas with sanctions, they are crippling the Iranian economy and keeping them subdued?
• The goal of the int'l sanctions was always to force Iran to the bargaining table, not to stop the bomb or make the country suffer (which is what is happening - as usual the people are hurting more than the regime).
• If the talks fell apart with no deal, faith in the sanctions would dissolve (they did not accomplish their stated goal), and most nations would pull out except the US (because sanctions hurt other nations too besides Iran - especially energy-thirsty China).
• Since the GOP doesn't understand trade and economics, they think unilateral US sanctions are great - but actually they don't do anything but create missed opportunities for us. Iran will get what they need from the hundreds of other nations. Since we have a strong role in the global fin. system - maybe we could cause some havoc there, but again - it's not going to stop Iran from getting a bomb.

• Could Iran use the sanctions relief to invest in better weapons tech and more clandestine development activities?
• Maybe, but they take on a huge risk by doing so, and the chance of success is low. If they can build a new high-tech production facility without inspectors, spies, regulators, and satellites noticing - well that is kind of our fault then.
• It's possible that they will use their increased wealth to boost their unfavorable activities in the region (supporting terrorism, meddling in Iraq, propping up Assad, etc.). But frankly those pains are secondary compared to a nuclear Iran and a certain attack by Israel. 

• Did Obama's team just negotiate poorly, and a better deal was possible?
• I'd like to hear how the GOP would have achieved a better outcome:
• Vast majority of centrifuges idled (not sure if destroyed, or idled)
• Vast majority of their fissile material confiscated
• Fairly good access by int'l inspectors
• Hard caps on enrichment far below weapons-grade
• No one died
• Iran's carrot was to greatly set back their bomb production, and the 5+1's carrot was lifting economic sanctions. It was a fair swap, like a prisoner exchange.
• In the GOP dreamworld, I am sure that they would hope to get 99% of what they want, while Iran settles for 1% of what they want. But unless you have hypnotism powers or a gun to their head, how do you get them to just fold and agree to your demands? A deal has to be mutually beneficial, and even if you are worried about benefiting your enemy, you accept a deal where the net gain to you is larger than no deal at all. And as I stated above, no deal was a bad situation.
• What else did critics want, a full regime change, recognition and peace with Israel, and renouncing of terrorism? If they want those things, then they'll have to pay for it (or at least build some relationship/trust first). So far, all they have given Iran is hate.
• They think Obama is weak and America shouldn't concede anything, we should just tell the world what's up and then they obey gratefully. Well the rest of the world isn't in awe of US "authority" like the GOP is, esp. after the War on Terror.  

• The Fox op-ed claims that Iran will exchange its partially enriched uranium for "raw" uranium that they can enrich in the future. There is no evidence that this will happen or the int'l community will accept this. And if you exchange the same mass of partially enriched U with 0% raw U, that will always make you further from a bomb. Fox needs to learn some math.
• Fox brought up more canards. The deal permits Iran to have some research centrifuges which could potentially improve enrichment. But there are so few of them that it can't make up for all the normal centrifuges that they have shuttered. So again, they are reaching for reasons to complain.
• I don't know much about the ballistic missile part of the deal. Maybe Fox is on to something there, but Iran's missiles can already reach Israel, Riyadh, and maybe Berlin. What does it matter if they can reach London too? They can't hit the US in the foreseeable future.
• Critics keep saying that this deal "paves the way" for Iran to get a bomb (a Bibi-ism). I just don't see any facts that support that claim. It's not a perfect deal, but no deal in the history of the world has been. If Iran can do all the sneaky things that critics claim to make a bomb, then they can do that without a deal too (and faster). Again, their argument is as well built as Bush's plan for post-war Iraq.
• And the GOP are some to talk: they haven't brokered a meaningful and legit int'l deal since Nixon went to China. And if Nixon tried something similar today, he would get skewered by the right. 
• But all of this might not matter if Congress has a veto-proof majority to scuttle the deal anyway! 

---

It still seems early for a lot of criticism, NPR interviewee didn't know how they were eliminating currently low enriched uranium as of a couple days ago.  So I imagine new info will keep coming.

The big concern that most have is that this does pave the way to a bomb, it is just a long way.  Over the next decade or so they get increased centrifuge numbers, more low enriched uranium stockpile allowed, etc.  The presumption is at some point between now and then Iran will have money and start to cheat.  And they will cheat for some amount of time before they get caught.  And at that time will the community bring back all the sanctions?  Will Iran have enough cash to not be limited?  So now instead of poor with a bomb they are rich with a bomb and more time and money spent on delivery of the bomb.

Personally I think that isn't right and the real alternative they are arguing is hold the line until they have to be bombed.  

I also think money and access to world markets will bring about a lot of westernization to Iran.  The web, foreign investors, generic trade, all tends to make the regular people richer which leads to a desire for personal freedoms.  Same thing happening in China right now.  Iran is much younger and better educated, on average, compared to China I believe.  

Also, no chance for Congress to block it anyways.  Obama vetoes anything he doesn't like.

---

Yeah I agree that the criticism seems premature - like they're predicting a divorce during the wedding reception. They could be right, but it would be just a lucky guess at this point.

I see what you mean about "paving the way" semantics. No deal would have also paved the way, and faster as you said. At least this deal "freezes" the problem for a decade (if all goes according to plan, which rarely happens), which is hopefully enough time to broker the next deal (maybe a better deal). Kicking the can down the road is not ideal, but better than tripping over the can now.

The deal does not guarantee cover for Iran to cheat with no consequences. As you said, it's possible but difficult that they will continue to develop (under the nose of inspectors) with their new cash. But if/when that is discovered (likely before an operational bomb), the 5+1 will retaliate and take measures to severely curtail any additional progress. For example, if they are 30% to a bomb now, and later they cheat to get to 50%, then other nations will make sure it is very, very hard for them to progress any further (potentially through military means). So in a sense, it doesn't even matter that they got to 50%, because they were found out and punished. Just as long as they don't get to 90%+. I wonder if the deal has conditions though if cheating is detected - what will explicitly happen to Iran?

Of course the alternative is them developing their bomb in secret, where we are shut out and have no idea what % of the way they are at, unless we have great espionage. Remember North Korea - one day they just detonated a test device, and that's how we found out they had bombs. Obviously we don't want to repeat that, and Israel would never allow it to get that far anyway (with severe global consequences).

Also agreed on the benefits of commerce to open up Iran and make it a better global citizen. Transparency rarely is bad thing, unless you're a bad guy. Obviously with North Korea we've seen that pariah status doesn't help a nation change, hurts pro-Western reformers, and only solidifies the tyrants' grip on power. I guess that's partly why the Chinese Communist Party tries to limit external influences through their firewall and repressive policies. But as Iran opens up and their younger generation gets more power (and hopefully their secular leaders will continue to be "moderate" like Rouhani), there could be positive social changes (that hopefully lead to better foreign policy).

Obama could veto Congress' blockage, but not if they have a 2/3 majority.  

---

Follow-up discussion to Cold War 2.0 post

In reading what you wrote I agree to a certain extent but you lost me in the conclusions that you draw:

(1) NATO is a military organization... but it is a *defense* organization; insofar as one might be talking about military matters or (implicitly?) reserving the right to use force, it is not offensive in the case of NATO.

(2) Expelling the baltic nations that joined NATO would likely only lead to a liability with no recourse (i.e. the need to defend nations that have been, at that point, willfully excluded); isn't the catch-22 with respect to military force (e.g. missile defense that could be withdrawn) that you would you need it when it's no longer there (i.e. not have a motivation to remove it once you've put it in place)?

(3) Withdrawal would remove the semblance of a pretense... but only where the facts of the same are clear; it is openly speculated that, within Russia, what is reported is not consistent with what is reported in America... further, if Russia is acting out of fear then they would just be that much more likely to start WWIII given the opportunity - so how to signal the absence of hostile intent (independent of never attacking Afghanistan & Iraq in the first place) while not rewarding the Russians for flouting international norms under the guise of keeping an unaccountable U.S. in check?

(4) Russia should withdraw from Crimea... though Vladamir Putin has publicly declared, on multiple occasions, that he will not do so (and that economic sanctions can damage the country for the next couple of years without it affecting his opinion).

(5) We cannot "just let Ukraine duke it out and let the chips fall as (uh, where) they may"... Much like the people in those Baltic states that joined NATO post-2000 it is not the fault of the people but rather their leaders (and the fears/uncertainties/dependencies of those leaders) insofar as there is some problem today - statecraft is slow, steady work (kinda like email) but that is all the more reason to not putz up what we already have in the first place (a sentiment I imagine you agree with)...

PS: There are probably a handful of people out there with the game theory experience to see right through the situation to a simple solution; all I know is that compromise requires give and take (as you hinted at) and working together towards a common goal - maybe Obama's efforts at nuclear deterrence (i.e. decommissioning of nuclear weapons) should get some attention before he leaves office.

---

Thx for your reply and hope you're well.

1. I agree with you about NATO's mission, but from the Russian perspective it doesn't matter - they are hostile and potentially offensive if they are observed to keep adding Eastern member states and massing troops near Russia. It is provocative.
2. You can't really win a cold war. Detente and the USSR collapse was exceptionally fortunate for the US and the world, and I'm not sure if we can expect it again. So the alternative is to reduce tension and live with a balance. That means a demilitarized buffer zone between NATO and Russia, to reduce fear on both sides. You presume that Russia intends to invade the Baltics. We don't know that for sure, and they may only be posturing to invade now because they see NATO massing and want to be able to strike first. You see how defense/precaution on both sides can lead to aggression? That is what we need to avoid.
1. I did say that NATO leaving the Baltics is based on a guarantee that they would help if Russia invades. So it is de facto like they are still in NATO (an attack on any member is an attack on all), but without the provocative troops presence that upsets Russia.
3. I think you signal lack of hostile intent and avoid rewarding Russia for bad behavior by: 
1. NATO pulling out of the Baltics, refusing to add any new members that are Russian neighbors, and ceasing military exercises on Russia's flank
2. But also requiring Russia to give back Crimea, stop its arms buildup in the arctic and on the Western border, and cease all military assistance to the Ukrainian rebels - only then will they lift the econ. sanctions
3. And let's remember - the goal is to avoid war, so there has to be some compromise. Sometime that means relaxing principles and "appeasing", as long as you believe it won't enable future worse behavior
4. Putin has to take a hard line with public statements, but I am not sure how critical Crimea is to his defense strategy (they obviously did just fine for decades without it). Again, if NATO pulled back, I think his fixation on Crimea would also naturally wane (esp. with the carrot of lifting sanctions on the table).
5. It's not like I want to abandon Ukraine, but what choice do we have? We can't allow Ukraine to be a proxy cold war and pretext for nuclear war. If either side meddles in Ukraine, it will necessitate a tit-for-tat by the other side, and then you get the escalation spiral. Maybe someone will blink like the CMC, but sadly we can't count on Putin to be as conscientious as Khruschev. And let's remember that the rebels are still at a disadvantage, and have little chance of taking over the country. Maybe the best thing is for Eastern Ukraine to secede if it stops the killing (like in Sudan)? Of course that is not ideal for the gov't in Kiev, but peace has a price.