http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201109061000
Richard White, a Stanford professor, recently published a book on the history of US railroads and the tycoons who ran them. Contrary to the popular mythology about the "heroic" and "self-made" champions of industry like Huntington and Stanford, it turns out that those men and the companies they ran only made it into the history books due to massive corruption, abuse of gov't resources, and human/environmental damage. And we have the general notion from econ 101 that firms make money by providing demanded goods/services to consumers in a cost-effective way. But for the railroads, every sort of business and market perversion you could think of (prior to the derivatives era) was attributed to them. Though we still have this strange adoration of the railroads as a romance and celebration of America, Old West freedom, and industrial capitalism.
Yes it was impressive that we could lay track from the Mississippi River to the Pacific in just a few years, and made amazing technological advances during the process, but it turned out to be a net loss for the country. Despite our misconceptions, many railroads went bankrupt or needed gov't "bailouts" to survive. And it was hardly free-market: transcontinentals were just not needed in the late 1800's (the demand for long-haul freight and personal transport just wasn't there to justify the huge costs), and even after the railroads were built, it was still cheaper and quicker to use SHIPS to get from SF to NYC, around South America and all. So what was the point of building them? Railroads were not reliable (especially during the winter months), so merchants still favored ships. Like any great capitalists, the railroads didn't respond to this deficiency with improved performance, but engaged in anti-competitive practice instead. They bought up most of the excess capacity on freight ships, creating scaricty and bringing ship rates closer to railroad rates. They negotiated with ship lines to get them to slow down their vessels too. Why try to outdo your competitors when you can just pay them to come down to your level instead?
The most respected railroad men avoided transcont. projects like the plague, and what was left were speculators, washed-up entrepreneurs looking for another chance, and crooks (sound like other modern industries we know?). What was significant about this period was the advent of corporate lobbying. The US railroads were pretty much the first manifestation of the modern American corporation. They pushed for Washington to create the conditions necessary for their flawed businesses to survive, similar to a Maoist or Soviet failed central-planning project. They were justified as a necessary "public good", even though the public had virtually no need for their services at the time. But when something is a public good, we may irrationally spend to keep them going even if they aren't doing any good for us. And of course stakeholders needed to justify their decisions and get public buy-in with propaganda and marketing, hence the Manifest Destiny, pride, and nationalism angles. There's nothing that US industry can't do, we're settling the savage lands with good old US hard work, go west for adventure and riches young man, yadda yadda. Sadly, there was more public outcry against the greedy, inept railroad corporations back then vs. the current greedy, inept firms today. The author speculates that this is due to enhanced marketing and penetration of US corporations today (corps play a much bigger role in US life today), so we are less likely to condemn something that we are associated with.
DC gave the railroads (RRs) huge guaranteed loans and literally millions of acres of free land (that they still own today and don't pay taxes on), even on terribly risky projects with no evidence of future profitability. RRs sold junk bonds to eastern investors by hiding much unflattering financials from traders (in fact, the big 3 US ratings agencies were started to rate RR bonds). And still the incompetent RRs needed several public bailouts to break even (even though the tycoons and big investors made out quite well off the US dime). And worse, the RR bankruptcy terms were so lax that the same doofus execs were allowed to retain control of the firms (not like Obama forcing GM to change their leadership team in exchange for bailouts, just when their execs were getting effective). Their debts were written off, so now these failed firms had a huge financial advantage over the viable, honest RRs (also sound familiar?), and drove some of them out of business. Talk about dysfunctional markets: the weak kill off the strong? Like the fruit companies in Latin America, the RRs asked the gov't to step in to violently break up labor strikes, clear out local Indians, and such. As many people died working on the RRs each year as the Civil War battle of Shiloh, often without investigation, punishment to firms, and compensation to victims (especially if they were Chinese).
So now that these joke of RRs were built, what to do with them? The firms had to get people to use them to gain revenue, so there was a big push to encourage settlement (although net population transfer was eastbound in the early RR years), buffalo hunting, cattle ranching, and mining in the West. There was no real demand for increased cattle ranching, silver, and buffalo, but the demand was manufactured with major gov't incentives, often with terrible environmental consequences (overgrazing, buffalo near extinction, mining pollution). And all the booms associated with those economies of course ended in bust and disaster for many Americans too.
If we learned our lessons from the RRs, the current dot-bomb and housing crashes might have been avoided. It's ironic that the most ardent libertarian proponents of the free market are the ones who most strongly advocate for our most uncompetitive industries. It's not the free market principles that they love, it's just taking advantage of whatever system is in place (loopholes and all) to come out ahead, no matter the cost to others. Obama and others talk about the need to invest in the future so we don't fall behind. But the problem is investments are based on predictions and many of those made by gov'ts turn out to be wrong. Look at the CA high-speed rail project - another total boondoggle where the true demand just doesn't justify the huge costs. Considering all the areas where CA needs more cash, it is a huge opportunity cost to sink billions into another rail gamble. But this is the price you pay when ideology trumps economics.
We wanted to settle the west and make tons of money, so we thought building RRs would get us there. But it was ahead of its time and caused a whole bunch of other problems. If you believe in the free market, let the market demand tell you when it's time to build RRs. If they are so desirable and well-planned, then they will easily get their own funding and won't need gov't loans and bailouts. The author contrasts the Dakotas. South Dakota's RR network was built bailout-free, and turned out to be much more high-performing than the nearby gov't-supported RR in North Dakota. In Europe and Japan, RR firms had to raise their own private capital before breaking ground, so their networks were a lot leaner, better, and weren't subject to the moral hazard associated with US firms wasting other people's money without accountability. Or if the RRs are truly a public good, nationalize them with a set of transparent laws and public input governing their operation. Of course there is the opposite extreme with China, where the gov't invested billions into another un-needed high-speed network, just to create jobs and grease the palms of various bureaucrats. But projects were rushed, safety standards and training ignored, and many of their trains run with mostly empty seats.
